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I.
iNTRODUCTION

On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court. in Kimel v. Florida Board of
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Regents, 1 held a fedeml civil rights statute unconstitutional for the first time
in 50 years.2 As a result of Kimel and several other recent Supreme Court
decisions, the ADEA' and ADA4 claims of state government employees are
in jeopardy. First, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,5 the Court
decided that Congress, when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause,6
does not have the authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment1
immunity. Second, in City of Boerne v. Flores,R the Court restricted the
power of Congress to pass civil rights Iegblation when acting pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the "spirit" of the Eleventh
Amendment was expanded to make state court enforcement of federal
statutory rights dependent upon the states' waiver of their own immunity
from suit in state court.9 In Kimel, the Court applied these principles to the
ADEA, holding that Congre'>s did not have the power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the ADEA to state employers and,
therefore, did not have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 10 During its 2000 term, the Court may extend Kimel
to the ADA, even though the ADA can be distinguished from the ADEA. 11

u.s.

528
62 (2000).
A MaJnr Chang~ in Ci•·il R1ghts lillgatton, 36 TRIAL 94. March 201Xl.
Age Dt<erimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, tt stq
4 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. er seq. (1994).
5. 517
44 ( 1996).
6. U.S CONST art. l. § 8, cl. 3.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
1!. City of Boerne v. Aores. 521 U.S. 507, 519-32 ( 1997) (holding thai because the Free Exercise
Clau~ of the Fir'l Amendment required that neutml laws only he mtional whereas the Religtous
I rccdom Restor&tion Act required '>lales to accommodate rcligton unle'' it mel a compelling interest
tc't the At:l wuld nol he sustained as enforcmg a consututiorwl nonn and thus was invalid). Su also
United Statts v. Morris(lll, 120 S . Ct. 1740, 1755-58 (2000) (holding the Violence Against Women Act.
whtch pro\tde' a federo~l ctvil remedy for victims of gender-m<)livllted vtolence, could not be validly
enacted under Se~:uon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment hecau-.e, even if there had been evidence of
gcnder·biased di,parJte treatment by state authorities, the law i' aimed at pmate individuals whereas
the amendment prohibit' only 'late action and is not restricted to ~tate~ 'Ahere diwrimination against
victims of gender-motivated crime' exist); Aorida Prepaid Po>tsecondary Education F.Jtpen!>e Board v.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627,640 (1999) (holding th;d because there Wb no e'idence of any
"ide,pread pauem of patent tnfnngcment b)' stale~>. C(mgre" was precluded from invol..mg it'
Founeenth Amendment power to abrogate state tmmunity from patent infringement suits); College
Sanngs Bank v. Aonda Prepaid Po~t-.econdary Education Ell:pcn~ Board. 527 U.S 666.670-75 (1999)
(hol<hng that because protection ag:unst fahe advenising docs not even implicate property rights
protected by the due proce•s clau!>C, Congres' could not rely on its Sccuon 5 remedial power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under the Lanham Act, which addresses false advenising).
9. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holdmg that Congres' lacks the power lo waive the
states' immunity to Fair Labor Standards Act clauns brought tn state court).
10. Kimel v. Aorida Bd. of Regents. 528 U.S 62, 82-90 (2000).
II. UmvcNIIY of Alabama at Btnnmgham Board of Tru<tees \. Garrell, ct'rt. gramed, 120 S. Ct.
1669 (2000). Su di..cuS\ion of this issue, infra notes 98- 126 and accompanying le>.l. Other Acls of
Congress arc threatened a\ a re!>ult of the dectston in Kimel. Su, t 1(., To\lon-.el " · Ml\soun, 233 F.3d
1094 (8th Cir 2000): Chinister v. Dcp't of Community and Econ. Dev, 226 I .3d 223 (3" Cir. 2000);
Katmter v Wtdman. 225 F .3d 519 (5 Cir. 2000); Suns v. Uni\ersJty of Cincinnati, 219 F .3d 559 (6•
1.

2.
3.

u.s.
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Several good arguments challenge the reasoning in each of these
cases. 12 However, it is not the purpose of this article to make those
arguments. Rather, this article explores the tatus of ADEA and ADA
litigation against state and local government and suggests ways of possibly
limiting the effect of Kimel. Each of the following propo itions will be
addressed in Section II. First, Kimel does not affect ADEA litigation
against local government because the ADEA represents a valid exercise of
Congress· power under the Commerce Clause and because local
governmental entities enjoy no Eleventh Amendment immunity. 13 Second,
by naming state governmental officials in their official capacity and
utili7ing the Ex parte Young 14 exception to the Eleventh Amendment, state
government employees can still obtain prospective injunctive relief under
the ADEA in federal court. 15 Third, in states that have waived immunity
from employment-related claims in their own courts, state employees can
bring ADEA claims in state court. 16 Fourth, the EEOC can bring suits in
federal court on behalf of state government employees to enforce their
rights under the ADEA. 17 Some of these potential avenue. are more

Cir. 2000). Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000) (all hold1ng Congre~' Jacked Section 5 po"-cr to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in passing the Family and Medical Leave Act).
12. Each of the dcci.,ions of the Supreme Court on the i\~ucs referred to wa' by a 5-4 vote. For
instance, in Seminole Tribe oj Florida, where the Court overruled the holdmg an Pennsvh•ania 1'. Union
Gas Co .. 491 U.S. I (1989), dec1ded only seven year~ earlier, Ju,llce Souter stated in hi' dissent that
"[ijn holdmg the Stale of Aorida immune to suit under the Indiana Gaming Regulatory Act, the Court
today holds for the lirst time smce the founding of the Republic that Congress has no authorit} to subject
a state to the jurisdiction of a federal court at the behest of an inthvidual as,erting a federal right." 517
U.S. atlOO. The dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens and Ju t1cc Souter more than adequately explain
why Seminole Trib~ of Florida is wrong.
Second, the decisions from City of Boerne through U.S. 1'. Morriwn. supra note 8, \eriously restrict
the power of Congres\ under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. If Congress, acung pursuant to
Section 5 of the fourteenth Amendment, can take no action beyond that wh1ch the Court either has or
would lind to be in violation of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, then Section 5 is relatively
meaningless. While the majority in Morrison ays "Section 5 i~ 'a positive grant of legislative
power." ... that mcludes authority to 'prohibit conduct which is not itself unconstuutional and [to]
intrud(e) mto 'legJslauve 'pheres of autonomy previously reser.•ed to the States,"' Morrison 120 S Ct.
at 1755, 1ts recent decis1ons seem inconmtent with that view of Section 5. Instead, the Court holcb that
"prophylacuc legislation under Section 5 must have a 'congruence and proporlionaluy between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."' /d. at 1758. Third, the Court· s
dec1sion to close the door to state courts to enforce federal rights 1~ contrary to earlier cases and, as
explamed in Jusucc Souter's lengthy dissenting opinion in Alden, 527 U.S. at 760-814, the historical and
s1are decisis arguments refute the majority'~ Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. See also Roger
Hartley, Tlr~ Alden Trilogy: Pratse and Prottst, 23 HARV. J. L & PuB. POL'Y, 323 (2000); Symposium:
State Sovereign Immunity & Tire Elel'tllllr Amendment, 15 NOTRL DAME L. REV.!! 17 (2000) (critiquing
the Supreme Court's SO\'ereign immunity decisions from the 1998 term).
13. Ste infra notes 18-37 and accompanying text.
14. 209 u.s. 123 (1908).
15. Su infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
16. Ste mfra note~ 59-91 and accompanying text.
17. Ste mfra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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problematic than others, but none has been precluded by the Supreme
Court. Section m will explain why Kimel should not be extended to claims
of disability discrimination by state employers and will discuss avenues
other than the ADA for litigating such claims.
II.
PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION TO ENFORCE THE ADEA AGAINST STATE
AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT

A.

Local Governmental Employees

Nothing in Kimel suggests Congress did not have the authority to pass
the ADEA pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. tb Indeed, the Supreme
Court had already flatly rejected a Tenth Amendment state sovereignty
defense in EEOC v. Wyoming,''~ where it sustained as a valid exercise of
the Commerce Clause power the 1974 amendment to the ADEA, which
extended the Act to include state and local government employers.20 Kimel
addressed an Eleventh Amendment problem, but the Supreme Court has
never suggested that the Eleventh Amendment protects local governmental
entities.:~• In Alden v. Maine, 22 the Court recently reaffirmed that a core
18. K1mel h1llc.h only thut Congress did not have the power to pass the 1974 amendment e:uendiog
the ADEA to state and local government pursuant to iL~ power under Section 5 of the Founeenth
Amendment and, therefore. did not ha\e the power to abrogate the ~tales' Eleventh Amendment
1mmumty. Kimel v. Honda Bd. of Regent~. 528 U.S. 62, 91.
19. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226. 236-39 (1983). See also Garcia v. San Antonio \letro
Tr..tn\lt, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
In two recent decision. the Supreme Coun has recognized state 'overeignty as o limitation on
Congress· Commerce Clauo,e power, but only in the narrow circumstance where Congrc~s 1\ compelling
the state legislaU\e or executive branch of government to enforce a federal regulatory program. Su
New York v. United State,, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that federal environmental law 1mpermhsibly
coerced state lcgi,lature\ mto enacting laws addre.,,ing low level radioactive wn\te); Prinll v. United
States. 521 U.S. 8911 ( 1997) (holding that Brady Handgun Act impennissibly commanded the 'tates·
chief law enforcement officer.. to ~earch records to ascertatn whether a person could lawfully purcha\e a
handgun). The limited nature of this n::striction was confirmed in Condon v. Reno, 5211 U.S. 141 (2000).
when the Coun unanimous!) upheld the vahdity of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which regulate~
the di\~emination and use of information contained in state motor vehicle n::cord~ and prohibits \tate
dcpartmcnb from disclosing personal information. The Coun determined that the Act did not violate the
Tenth Amendment or principles of federalism bccau'e it did not "require the •aates '" therr soven::ign
capacity to regulate their O\\n cittzens." /d. at 151. Becau\C federal anti-discrimination laws, such as
the ADA and ADF.A do not single out states or force them to enact or implement federal statutes, they
remain unaffected by the\C recent federalism ruhng\.
20. FEOC \ , Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243. Su also Humcnansky v. Regents of University ot
Minnesota, 152 F.3d 822. 826 (8th Cir. 1998): Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833.
840 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997).
21. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 49 I U.S. 58, 70 ( 1989). See also Lincoln County
v. Lumng. 133 U.S. 529, 530 ( 1890) (holdmg that the Ele\·coth Amendment does not bar a federal suit
agam't a county).
22. 527 u.s. 706 ( 1999).
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principle of the sovereign immunity doctrine "is that it bars suit against
states, but not lesser entities. The immunity does not extend to suits
proc;ecuted against a municipal corporation or other governmental entity
that is not an arm of the state."23 Thus, Congress need neither abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity when regulating local government nor look
for congressional power to do so in Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In her majority opinion in Kimel, Justice O'Connor remarks that
Congress Jacked authority to adopt the 1974 amendment to the ADEA
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because "Congress had
virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of
age."24 This does not mean, however, that the 1974 amendment is invalid
as an exercise of Commerce Clause power; the Court docs not overturn the
holding in EEOC v. Wvoming that age discrimination, even if not contrary
to the Equal Protection Clause, adversely affects interstate commerce and
thus falls within Congress' power.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as a source of congressional authority for the 1974
amendment of the ADEA, became important only after the Court
determined that Congres · could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity when acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause,zs and thus state
employers cannot be sued in federal court without their consent. Aside
from th1s re triction, the 1974 amendment to the ADEA remains valid as to
both state and local government employers, and it can be enforced in
federal court when suing a local governmental unit. 26
The decision in Kimel may cause local governmental employers to
argue that they are really state agencies or arms of the state in order to take
advantage of Eleventh Amendment protectionY Determining the status of
state agencies requires a careful review of state law2R and, since the primary

~~-

/d. Ill 756.

K1mel v. florida Bd. of Regent\, 528 U.S 62, 91 (2000).
Seminole Tribe of florida v florida. 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996)
:!to. Su. ~-~·· Conle> v. Village of Bedford, 215 L 3d 703 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
municipality is not entitled to I:.lcventh Amendment immunity and ADEA suit could proceed in federal
coun): Nann v. Lo~er Menon School Dist.. 206 F.3d 323 (3rd Cir. 2000) (holding that plruntiffs
ADEA claim is allowed to proceed as school district is not ann of the stale enUiled to Eleventh
Amendment Immunity): Gav1gnn v. Clarkstown Central School D1~1.. 84 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y
2000) (holdmgthat ~chool distnct1s not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 1mmunity from ADEA suit).
27. Su. e.g.. Conley, 215 F.3d 703; Narin, 206 f .3d 323; Gavignan, 84 F.Supp.2d 540.
:!t!. Se~. ~.g .• Mt. Healthy City School Di~l. v. Doyle, 429 U.S 274, 280 (1977) (explaining that
'wte law defined a ..chool board as a political subdivision): Rounds v. Oregon State Board of Higher
Education, 166 F.3d 1032. 1035-36 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that the University of Oregon, a.~ well as the
Oregon Swte Board of H1gher Educauon, is an ann of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes
l>ecau..c the uni\ersity i~ not nn independent legal entity and it perfonns central government functions
under the control of the Board of Education); Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, 975 F.2d 1555,
:!4.

:!~.
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purpo.;e of the Eleventh Amendment was to protect state treasuries, the
source of funds to satisfy any judgment becomes important. 29 However,
other factors may also be important to the analysis. For example, in Mr.

-62 (10th C1r. 1992) modified en bane 995 F.2d 992 ( lOth Cir. 1993) (holding that because of
ual autonomy from state government and financial independence from state treasury, local
board in Utah b not ann of state for Eleventh Amendment purposes); Carr v. Cny of Florence,
~16 F.2d 1521, 1525-26 (lith Cir. 1990) (holding that because under state law sheriff b \ 1ewed a.~
ll\·e ofliccr of ~tate and his depuues are under significant control of ~henff, oflicial capacity ~uits
't ~uch officials are shielded by Eleventh Amendment even though officials are paid by county and
ty pt:r..onnel board e}(crcises some control over terrns and conditions of depuues' emplo) ment;
there is no clear ev1dcnce that counties will pay damage award against sheriff or h1~ deputies, the)
.e 1mmune from suit under Eleventh Amendment); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (10th Cir.
) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment issue is determined by e}(amining power~. nature and
charactcru.ucs of agency under state law); Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1059-60 (5th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the state Dcpanmcnt of Health and Human Resources and its hospital were alter ego' of
uue entitled to immunity \\here state law characterized department as arrn of state and any judgment
against either pany would be paid from state funds).

29. Lake County Estate>. lnc. '. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 44() U.S. 391, 401-02 ( 1979)
(finding bi-~tate authority i-. not an arm of the state based on independence of agency, fact that funding
was provided by neighboring counties, and fact that judgments agautst the agency were e}(prcssly not
going to bind either state); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment IS tnggcred where monetary relief will tnevitably come from the general revenue' of the
-.tate); Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansa~ State Umv., 64 F.Jd 442, 446-47 (8th Cir, 1995) (holding that
~tate university, which could not spend fund-. w1thout appropnation by general assembly, is ~tate agency
protected by Eleventh Amendment); Christy v. Pennsylvania TumpiL:e Comm'n. 54 F.3d 1140. 1145
(3rd Cir. 1995) (placing special emphasis on funding factor, and finding that. based on fundmg, ~talus at
state law, and autonomy, a' well as totality of factors, Commi~sion is ~ubjcct to suit in fcdeml court);
Ba}(ter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 732-33 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that mo\t
Significant factor i~ whether entity has power to raise 1ts own funds and concluding after review of
Indiana statutory scheme, that, even though state exercises some supervision over count) welfare
department-.. they arc not protected by Eleventh Amendment because they have their own taxing and
bonding power and ab1lity to satisfy judgments by means other than resorting to state treo.~sury): Sherman
v. Curator.. of Univ. of Missouri, 16 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that whether or not srate
university is protected by Eleventh Amendment i~ determined by looking to degree of local autonomy
and control, and most importantly whether funds to pay JUdgment could come from state trea.sury; ca-.e
remanded for determination in light of plaintiffs allegation~ that only one-third of univer.ity budget
comes from -.tate appropriation and a judgment would not nece~sari ly be paid from the state funds);
Hut!o.ell v. Sayre, 5 F. 3d 996,999-1002 (6th Cir. 1993) (holdmg that University of Kentucky IS an arm of
the \tate entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection because budget i~ set by the legislature as part of
the go,emor's executive budget and a monetary judgment would be paid from the state treasury):
Boeke~ '· Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that County ~partment of Soc1al
SerYices protected from damage awards by Eleventh Amendment because the judgment would be paid
from a self-in~urance progmm that i~ 80% state funded): Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct
& Sewer Auth., 991 F2d 935, 940-41 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that sewer authority has no access to
Commonwealth treasury and therefore Eleventh Amendment does not protect it even though it receive~
pan of its funds from Common\loealth; mabihty to draw on pubhc fisc "cripple-;" immunil) defense):
Rivas '· freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that because fund~ used to satisfy
liability of -.heriff and deputies do not come from state treasury, there IS no Eleventh Amendment
protection): Holley v. La,ine, 605 F.2d 638,644 (2nd Cir. 1979) (holding that local service agency may
be sued a-. an independent political enuty wh1ch bear. "ultimate responsibility" for public assistance
payments, since state \\as under no requirement to indemnify counlles for judgmenLs rendered against
it).
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Healthy City School District v. Do.vle, 30 the Court held that a school board
does not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity because state law defined a
school board as a political subdivision and because the school board was
given the power to issue bonds and levy taxes under state law .31 Although
the school board was subject to guidance from the State Board of Education
and received a significant amount of funding from the state, it could be sued
in federal court.32 In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court stressed that the
Eleventh Amendment is triggered where monetary relief will inevitably
come from the general revenues of the state, indicating that a raid on the
state treasury is the primary concern. 33 Later, in a case involving a bi-state
authority,34 while the Court identified several factors to be considered in
determining the immunity issue, it emphasized that the twin reasons for the
Eleventh Amendment-the states' dignity and prevention of federal court
judgments that must be paid from the state treasury-remain the ''prime
guide." 35 The latter of these reasons was referred to as the "impetus for the
Eleventh Amendment,"36 which was enacted in the wake of a Supreme
Court decision allowing a damage action to proceed against a state in
federal court.37
Once it is determined that a governmental employer is, in fact, not
protected by the Eleventh Amendment, ADEA claims against such an
employer should be allowed to proceed in federal court. However, the
plaintiffs in such cases should be prepared to address the threshold question
relating to the status of the governmental employer.

B. Naming State Govemmental Officials in Their Official Capacity
This would be a relatively non-controversial avenue into federal court
for state employees seeking to enforce the ADEA were it not for recent
circuit court decisions holding that liability under the federal employment
discrimination statutes-ADEA, Title Vll, and the ADA- is generally
limited to the employer and does not include agents of the employer. 3 ~
429 u.s. 274 (1977).
/d., 429 U.S. at 280-81.
/d.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665-66 ( 1974).
34. The Port Authoriry, e\tablished by New York and New Jer~y puf\uant to the lnter<itatc
Commerce Clause of the U.S. ConMitution, Art. I,§ 10, ct. 3.
35. Hess v. Port Auth. Tr.ms-Hudson Corp.. :513 U.S 30,47 (1994).
~6. /d. at 48.
37. Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dall. 419 (1793), whtch holds that Article ITI authorized a pmate
citizen of another ~tate to sue the state of Gcorgta without tts consent, is generally vte~cd as the catal)"'t
for the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g.. Welch v. State Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp.. 483 U.S.
468,484-85 (1987).
:18. Su. e.g.. Silk v. Caty of Clucago, 194 F.3d 788 <7th Cir. 1999) (boldmg thut ADA provides
only for employer, not mdividualliabihty); Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400. 405 (6th Cir.
30.
31.
32.
33.
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These decisions are questionable because the definition of "employer" in
these statutes includes agents of the employer. 39 The circuits, in fact, were
divided on the individual liability question40 until Congress added a damage
remedy to Title VII in 1991.41 The concern reflected in many post-1991
decisions seems to be to avoid individual liability for damages on the part
of corporate officials.42 For example, in the context of sexual harassment
19971 (holding thai mdiVIdual habtlny ., protubued under Title VII): Mason v. Stalling,, K2 F.3d 1007
(11th Cir 1996) (boldmg that Title I ol ADA does not provide for indi' idualliability, only for employer
linbilityl; Stults v. Conoco. Inc. 76 F.3d 651,655 (5th Cir 1996) (holding that the ADEA prov1des no
ba.'•' for mdividualliahility for supem\Ory employee~): Thelen v. :'vf.Jrc·~ Big Boy Corp.. 64 F.3d 264,
267 n 2 (7th Cir. 19951 (rcfening to its ruling in ADA cal><:, coun indicates "it., likely that Stephen
Marcus, as an individual, could not be liable und.:r the ADEA"); E.E.O.C. Y. AIC Sec. Investigation,,
Ltd .. 55 F ..3d 1276, 1279-82 <7th Cir. 1995). rt-h tn bane dt-nrt'd. June 28, 1995 (holdtng that O\\<ner of
compan)' not indi\iduall) hablc under ADA): Smith '. Lomalt. 45 F 3d 402, 403·404 n.4 (II th Cir.
1994) (holding that count)' commhs•oner\ may not be held individually liahh: under ADF.A ): Birbcck'
Mane: I Lighting Corp.. ,,0 F.3d 507.510-11 (4th Cir. 1994), art. dtmi~d. 513 L...S 105!! ( 1994) (holdmg
that the ADEA doe' not prov ide for indiYiduaJ hab1hty of supen i\lll' \\ho made deCI\IOn to dhcharge
plaint if!\); Miller v. \ttallwell's lnt'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 5!!7 -88 (9th C1r. 1993), em dt'nil'd, 510 U.S.
1109 (1994) (rccogni11ng contrary authority, coun holds that Congres~ d1d not 1ntc:nd to impo~e
individual liability on employees under AOI!A); Bushy v. City of Orl<~ndo, 931 I· .2d 764. 772 (I I th Cir.
1991) (holding that di,charged black c•t} pollee officer could not mamtam Title VTI action again~t
~a)or, Police Caplam. and Chief in thc1r individual capacity becau'e indi,idual l'llpacuy suit;. are
inappropriate under T1tle VU).
.'9. Age Di-.crimination in F.mploymenr Act. 29 L...S.C. § 630(b): Amcncan' Wuh Di~abtlitie,
,\ ct. 42 L.. .S.C. § 1211 )(5)(A); Title Vll of the Civ1l RJ~hts Act of 1964.42 U.S.C § 2000c(b).
«<l. Su. t.f!... Shager '. UpJohn Co.. 9 n F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that statutory
language of ADEA could mean that supervi~or is liable along with employer, or even pos~ibly mstead of
employer); Parolinc v. Um~)' Corp.. 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir 19!!9) (holding that individual qualifies
as an "employer" under T1tle Vll tf he or ~he ~n;es in a supervisory position and e'erci~' \ignificant
control over plaintiff' h1ring, firing. or conditioru. of employment, and such an employee may be held
liable for any actionable -e\ual h31'lb,ment m which he or ~he personally panicipated); Jones v.
Continental Corp.• 789 f'.2d 1225. 1231 (6th Cir. 1986) (li,ting ~Ycral ca~' holding that indi\'lduah
may be held per\onally liable as agents of employers under Title Vlll: Barkley '. Carraul\.. 533 r Supp.
242, 24'i I S.D. Tex. 19!!2) (holding that indi' tdual dcpanmenl man.1gcrs of corporate defendant are not
entitled to dismi~~al when sued under ADEA).
41. The statutory authori.tation for damages i' found m 42 V.S.C. § 1981 a. wh1th applies to T itle
VII actions as well as those brought to enfor1.-e the ADA. Both Title VII and the ADA define the word
"employer" to mcludc "agent,." See 5upra note 39.
4:!. Su, t.g.• Onez '·Washington Count)'. State of Or.:gon, 88 F..3d !!O·t 808 (9th C1r. 1996)
!holding that Title vn claims against individuals sued 10 their mdividuall'llp3Ctties \\ere dl'·missed. but
claim~ against indi,iduah in their official capacitie~ \\t:n: allowed); Tomka v. Seiler Corp.. 66 F.3d
1295. 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an interpretatiOn of Title Vn to allow for mdmdual supen i~or
liah•hty would produce a result at odds with congressional intent to protect small cmplo)tr\ and.
therefore, an emplo)er's agent should nm he held indl\ •dually liable under Title VJI) Welch Y. Laney,
57 F.3d 11>04. 1009 (lith Cir. 1995) (holding that T itle VII plaintiff has a cause of acuon again't the
sheriff in his official capac•ty. but not h1s indi,idual capac•ty): Lehhardt v Basic lnst. of Tech. 55 F 3d
377. 380 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that although mdtviduah cannot be sued m their indl\ idual capacttJes
under Title VII. ~uch acllons can be brought agailbt individual employee' in their official capacitie,);
BirbccL. '· Man·cllc Lighting Corp.. 30 F.3d 507.510 (4th Cir. 1994) ("It \\OUid be incongruou~ to hold
that the ADEA docs not apply to the owner of a busine" employing. for e~amplc. ten people. but that 11
doc) apply \\ith full force to a per;on "ho supervi~, the same numher of worJ..er\ in a compan)
employing twenty or more."); Sauer' v. Salt Lake County. I F. 3d I I 22. 11 25 (10th Cir 1993)(holding
that under Tille vn. ,uits mu't proceed against ind1viduab in their official capaciue' only: ind1' idual
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claims under Title VII, the individual responsible for the harassment cannol
be required to atisfy a monetary judgment. 4 ~
The exclus ion of suits against "agents" is not a major roadblock where

capacrty \uits arc inappropriate); Haney v. Blake. 913 F.2d 226, 227-211 , 'ith C ir. 1990) (explaming that
the pnl\ i\ron rn Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000clbl. means that indrvidual ~ acting as nn employer's
"agent\" \\-Ill he lrahlc rn thctr official capacllles only). s~~ also Knsti Lappe. "/ Ju.\1 Work Her~";
Pr~cluding .'iupt'rvimn ' lndil'ldual Liability Under lh~ F~d~ral Amidi1criminutirm StuJutes and the
Ari:ona Cil'll Ri.~hts Act, 27 AR17- ST L. 1 1301. 1311 (1996) ("Mo~t crn:uit\ that have addressed the
i~sue of individual hahihty pursuant to the antidiscrimioatron acb pn:1perly concluded that courts should
not impo-e indr\rdual liability. In declining to imP<l'le <,uch liahrlrty, the couns examined the
antrdisc.:nminatron statutes, the doctrine of re~pondeat 'uperior. the economrc mmitleauons of impo\ing
indi\ idual liability, and the polrcy consideration-. underlying the >tatutes."): Christopher Greer, l'ote,
"Who. Ml· ''.A Supenisor's lndn·iduall.iubilityfor Di.1crimmullon in the Workplace, 62 FOROHA\1 L.
REV. 1835, 1836 ( 1994) ("Ba<;ed on the purpo,;c. of the Acts. their talutory language, and the ca<;e law,
individuals can and ~hnuld he held liable for their dbcriminatory act'> under hoth Title VlJ and the
ADF.A ."l

Cf. Canderlaria v. Cunnrngham, 2000 WL 798636 CS.D.N Y. 2000) (reJecung the disuncuon ba!>ed
on capacity, the coun held that rndividuals may not be held hable under the ADA in either capacity);
Bouagc v. Suburban Propane. 77 F Supp. 2d 3 10. 313 (N.D.N Y 2000) (holdrng that an employee
could not bring Title vn or ADEA claims against individual defendant' in therr personal or official
capacities e\en if 'he "'as seekrng prospective mjuncthe relief agarn\t ..uch defendants; any distmction
between holding individuals li:~hle in their official or pei"''nal capacity would place the coun in a
po~ition of holding an individual liable without providing the employee "rth a remedy at law); Pcmrick
v. Stra.:hc:r. 67 F Supp. 2d 149, 169 (E.D '< Y. 1999) (holding that rndi\·idual liability bar applie!> to
rndividu"l defend.mt\ in therr official capacrtie,, as well :l'> to '>!lunuons when: the plaintiff <;eek\
pmspecti\1.~ injunctive rclicfagainst such individual-): McBride v. Routh, 51 F Supp. 2d 153. 156 (D
Conn. 1999) (queMioning the utrlity of the oftlciaUindividual capacity di'>tim:uon).
.n. See. e.R·· Grant v. !.ode Star Co., 21 F.3d 649.651 53 (5th Cir 1994), cut. dt'nit'd, 513 U.S
I 0 15 (1994) (holdmg that the dl\trict coun improperly held emplo}'ee· s ~uperior hablc for o:exually
harassing her because Title Vll contemplates liability only for the employer); Smrth v. St. Bernard's
Reg' l Med Ctr.. 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir 1994) (holding that claims again~t individual defendants
were properly dismi~'ed because liahrlrty under Trtlc VII can attach only to employers); Sauers v Salt
Lake County, I I .3d 1122, 1125 (10th Crr 1993) (holding that since indi~idua! capacity 'urts arc
inappropriate under Title VII. ouit again\! county auorn.:y could proceed only in hrs officral capacity
and, thu,, opemted as suit again~l c1>unty it'>elf; thus. plamtiffs rnitial complaint failing to name the
county \hould be deemed to relate back to onginal complaint \\-here county allomey "a' named a.~
dt:fendantl: ~1rllcr v. Maxwell's lnt'l. Inc., 99 1 F.2d 583,587 19th Cir. 1993). ct>n. d~m~d. 510 U.S
1107 (199-l) (holding that although the tenn "employer" under Title VIIi' defined to include any agent
of the employer. thi. language wa' rncluded to incorporate rt'~pondeat supenor liability and docs not
ju~tify imposing indi\idual lial'lility on ~upen isory employee,; blatutory scheme of Title Vll. which
limib lial'lility of 'mall employers even as amended, indicates that Congress did not intend to impo'e
individualliahility 1m employees): Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d 226, 227-2!1 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
un) recovery again\t ~upcrvisor must be in her ofticial rather than mdivrdual capacity, because
' upervr,or'' lr.1bilrty under Title
is premi'ed upon her role as an agent of the crty); Padway v.
Palches. 665 F.2d 96'i. 968 (9th Cir 1982) (holding that hack pay awards arc to be paid hy the
employer. not rndr\ rdua.l defendants); Johnwn v N I ndiana Puh. Serv Co., 844 F. Supp. .t66, 468 (N D.
lnd. 1994) (linding no individual liability): Pelech v Klaff.Jo\S, L.P. 828 F. Supp. 525. 529 ( .D. Ill.
1993) (holding that indr~rdual supcn·isors are not "employers" whu can be sued under Title vn rn therr
individual capacrty); Pommier v. James L. Edelstein Enter·,, 816 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(holding that 'upen isor may not be individually liahle for T itle Vll sexual discriminallon, but " an
agent liable only in hr' official capacity); Wei's v. Coca Cola Bonhng Co. of Chicago. 772 F Supp.
407. 410-11 CN D. Ill. 1991) (finding ~upeni,or i-. liahlc !!1r !>Cxual harassment only rn hi\ oflictal
capacil) , i c .. "-'a surrogate for the emplo)er).
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a private sector employer is sued. However, because Kimel foreclo!.es suit
against state employers, litigants and courts should revisit the question of
whether "agents" may be named, at minimum, to enjoin continuing
violations of the ADEA. In suits against government officials, there is a
long-standing recognition that the capacity in which the individual is sued is
important. Beginning with Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized
that state officials could be sued in their official capacity, providing an
opportunity for injunctive relief without individual liability ..w This wellestablished exception to the Eleventh Amendment was confirmed in
Alden.45 However, the Court has made it clear that the Ex parte Young
"fiction" allows only prospective injunctive relief designed to end the
illegal action, not retroactive relief that results in a raid on the state
treasury :~6 Damages may not be awarded by the federal courts against the
governmental officials. in their official capacity, because such suits are, in
effect, suits against the governrnent.47
44. Ex pane Young. 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Sre also Will v. Michigan Depl. of State
Police, 491 U.S 58. 70 n. 10 (1989).
45. Alden v. Maane, 527 U.S. 706,757 (1999) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment "does not
bar certain actions again'>t ~tare officers for injunctive or declaratory relief.").
46. Su Green v. Mansour. 474 U.S. 64,68 (1985); Pennhur.t State Sch. and Ho~p. \". Halderman,
465 U.S 89, 102-03 ( 1984); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332.337 (19791: Eldennan v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651.668 (1974).
47. See Edelman\. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651.663 (1974); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464,472-73
( 1985). See alw Carnphdl v. Arlan'a' Dept. of Corr. 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
while state officials can be sued in federal court in their official capacitie~ for pro,peclive injunctive
relief. including reanstatemem. the alternative remedy of front pay is not analogous to pro~pective relief
because it must be paid from the state treasury); Barber v State of Hawaii, 42 F.3d I 185, 1198 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars award of damages agaanst ~tate officaals an their
official capacaty); Nnuve Village of Noatak v. Blatchford, 38 F.3d 1505. 1511 - 13 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that order requiring state commissioner to disbur..e funds to pluanuff, when funds "ere held
pursuant to court order pending outcome of litigation, is not prospective relief and \lonuld affect state
treasury; therefore Ele\enth Amendment bar.. plaintiff's claim to disputed fund.,); Estate of Poner by
Nelson v. State of Illinois, 36 1.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 1994) (holdang that suits namang state of!iciat.. in
their official capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment if they seck retroactive relief (damages) from
~tate treasury): Arnold v. McClain. 926 F.2d 963. 966 (lOth Cir. 1991) (holdang that district attorney is
\tate officer and claim for damages again~! him in his oflicial capacity is barred); Chrissy F. by Medley
v. Mississippi Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 1144, 849 (5th Cir 1991) (holding that claim for damages
against state officer in officaal capacity is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that state is real party in Interest if decision rendered would operate
again'! 'O\Creagn, expending it\elf on the public treal.ury. interfering with public administration. or
compelling the state to act or to refman from acting); DeYoung v. Patten, 898 F.2d 628. 635 ,8th Cir.
1990) (holding that where complaant :.tate:. cla1m against official~ in their official capacity, it is not
sufticicntly clear to g•ve them nouce that the) are heang sued in their andividual capacity; where
complaant failed to specaf) whether a third official 1\ heang sued in official or individual capacity or
both, complaint must be construed as stating only official capacit) claim barred by Eleventh
Amendment). m·~mlled on other ground~ by Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Tele\iSIOn Communication
Network Found .. 22 F.3d 1423 (8th Cir. 199~); Holloway v. Conger, 896 F.2d 11 31. 1136 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that suit against state board and its members in thear official capacaty, which seek\ only
damages. is barred by Eleventh Amendment); Free v. Granger, 887 I .2d 1552. 1557 (II th Clf. 1989)
(holding that ~uits ag:unM officials in their official capacity for damages arc effccthcly suits agaanst the
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Even if one accepts the circuit court opm10ns designed to protect
corporate officials from individual liability in actions under the federal antidiscrimination statutes, there is no reason why these decisions should be
expanded to claims for prospective injunctive relief against state
governmenlal officials in their official capacity .48 In Alden, the Court
invoked Ex parte Young and reiterated that sovereign immunity "does not
bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory
relief."49 While such suits are, in reality, suits against the state, the Ex p arte
Young fiction avoids some of the effects of the current Court's expansive
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and it has long been recognized
that this fiction is critical in ensuring state compliance with federal
statute!-..5° As part of its federalism agenda, the Supreme Court has chipped
away at the Ex parte Young exception, but the damage appears to be minor
and, for the majority of Justices, the rule remains alive.~~ Suits against state
entity which are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment absent waiver since any damage award would
be paid out of the state treasury); Lenca v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171. 1178 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that
although plamtiff sued individual defendanL~ in their individual capacities for back pay, claim was really
one for retroactive award of monetary relief from state treasury and did not have merely an "ancillary''
effect on state treasury and is thus barred by Eleventh Amendment); Meadov.s v. Indiana, 854 F.2d
1068, 1069 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that where complaint fai ls to designate whether action against
individual dcfendanL~ i~ official capacity or pen.onaJ capacity, court will assume official capacity
complamt barred by Eleventh Amendment); Wisconsin Hosp. Ass'n v. Retvitz, 820 F.2d 863. 867 (7th
Cir. 191!7) (holding that ~uit brought against state officials. but with object of obtaining pecuniary relief
from state itself, is squarely within the scope of Eleventh Amendment); Graham v. Nat'! Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 804 F.2d 953, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that where plaintiffs seek to impose no
liability on university officials as indivitluaJs, but have directed all their argument~ against university.
suit is ehsentially one for recovery of money from state treasury).
4ll. See employment case~ cited supra note 42, sec abo Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019,
I026 (9th Cir. 1997). cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 ( 1998) (holding. in action seeking prospective
mjunctive rehefto e nd discrimination against inmates with disability. that such relief fits within £t parte
Young exception to Eleventh Amendment); Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (lith Cir. 1995)
(holding ba.,ed on stale law that sheriff is state, rather than county, official; Eleventh Amendment
applies but docs not bar prospective injunctive relief against hhcriff); Uttilla v. Tennessee Highway
Dept. 40 F. Supp. 2d 968. 975-77 (W.D. Tenn. 1999), af!'d 208 f.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiffs may pun.ue declaratory and injunctive relief again\t commissioner in his official capacity in
suit brought under Tide ll of ADA); Henrietta D. v. Guiliani, 8 1 F. Supp. 2d 425,430 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suit against Commi\sioner of the New York
State Department of Soc•al Services seeking access to publici}' subsidized benefits).
+9. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 757.
50. CHARLLS ALAN WRIGHT, L AW OF fEDERAL COURTS 292 (1983) ("[TJhe doctrine of Ex parte
Young seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law.").
51. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 ( 1996), the Court held that courts should
hesitate before allowing use of the Ex parte Young exception "where Congress has prescribed a detailed
remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right[.]" /d. at 74. An
Indian tribe was not allowed to usc the £'C parte Yow1g exception in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of
ldalw, 521 U.S. 261 (1997), a case de~cribed as '"unusual in that the Tribe's \uit is the functional
equivalent of n quiet title action which implicates ~peciaJ sovereignty interests." /d. at 281. Here, the
Tribe sought a determination that certain lands are not within the regulatory juriMiiction of the state and
it sought injunctive relief barring state officials frome~ereising their governmental powers and authority
over the disputed area. If the Tribe were to prevail, the Coun indicated "Idaho's sovereign interest in its
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government officials in their official capacity, where the plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief, thus provide a viable approach to ADEA claims by state
government employees.
Of course, such suits do not provide full relief to ADEA plainLiffs.
Because the Ex parte Young fiction allows only prospective injunctive
relief, back pay is not available.52 Compensatory and punitive damages are
generally not available under the ADEA in any case. 53 Prospective

lands and water would be affected in a degree fully :h iniCUsive a.' almost any conceivable retroactive
levy upon fund' in its trea\ury. Under these particular and special ctrcumstances, we find the Youn~
e"ception inapplicable." /d. at ::!87 (empha~is added). Although Justice Kennedy. joined by Jusucc
Rehnquist. argued in favor of a more drastic rcvisioo \\.here courts would engage in an ad hoc
"balancing and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young el\cept1on apphes
in a given case," id. at 278, the majority rejected this approach.
Lower courts have recx>gnized that these two case~ tmposc a narrow el\ccption and that & parte
Young remains the rule. Su. e.g .• Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484,500 (l ith Cir. 1999J,cer/. granted,
121 S. Ct. 28 (2000) (Semmole does ntlt bar J:.x parte Young action because Section 602 of Title V1
contains no e:'tplicit rcmedtal ~cheme); Hart'. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280. 1286 (10th Cir. 1999} (ellplammg
that Coeur d'Alene ts distingui~hed because a state's interest in admini;,tenng a welfare pwgram
partially funded by the federal government is not ~uch a core -.overcign interest as to preclude Ex pane
Young); Summit Mcd. As~ocs. v. Pr)or, 180 F.3d 1326. 1340 (lith Cir. 1999) (explaining that Coeur
d'Alene is distinguished because the ~tate's real property interests are not at stake; although Alabama
ha~ an intere~t 10 regulating the o~bortions of viable fetuse~. a declaro~tory judgment Y.ould not prevent
the state from regulating late· term abortion' 1n other ways and ~hould not be barred by Eleventh
Amendment); Litis v. Univ. of Kansas Med. Ctr.. 163 F.3d 1186, 1197 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holdmg that
Seminole'.\ detailed remedial 'cheme analys1s doe\ not apply because Seminole did not limn the use of
Er parte Young as the means of enforcing con~titutional rights); Branson Sch. D1't Rl:.-82 v. Romer,
161 F.3d 619. 632 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that fundamental sovereign!) issues arc not implicated
when plaintiff ~eks the functional eqUivalent of a breach of ICUst acuon seekmg onl) prospective
inJunctive rehef again>t state officials, so Ex parte Young is apphcable): Buchwald v. Univ. of New
Mex1co Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487.496 (lOth Cir 1998) (holding that Couerd'Aiene limitation only
applies in "unique circumstances" and not when requested relief will not affect the core aspect' of state
sovere1gnty; it only applie~ in "unique circumstances"): Marie 0. '.Edgar. 131 F jd 610, 617 (7th Cir.
1997) (distinguishing Coeur d'Alene because no 1mportant sovereignty intcre~t~ arc at stake when
plaintiff is seektng to enforce compliance wtth a federal program).
52. Back pay is available under the ADEA in case~ Y.herc the Eleventh Amendment ., not a
con-.dcration. See, e.g., Banks v. Tra\clers Cos., 180 F.3d 358, 364 (2nd Cir. 1999): Mo~e v S. Union
Co., 174 F.3d 917, 927 (!lth Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Ma\Se) Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d
1244. 1251 (lith Cir. 1997); Newhouse v. McCormick & Co.. lnc., 110 F.3d 635,639 (8th Cir 1999);
EEOC v. Kentucky State Police Dept., 80 F.3d 1086, 1097 (6th Cir. 1996); Smith \. Officer of
Per,onncl Mgmt., 778 F.2d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 1985).
53. See, e.g., Espinueva v. Garrett. 895 F.2d 1164. 1165 (7th C1r}. reh 'g. denied. 498 U.S. 891
(1990); Bruno v. Western Elcc. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966-67 (lOth Cir. 1987); Goldstein ' Manhattan
lndu,., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1446 (lith Cir. 1985); Johnson v AI Tech Specialty Steel Corp., 73 1 F.2d
143, 148 (2nd Cir. 1984): Perrell v. Finance American Corp.. 726 F.2d 654.657 (lOth Cir. 1984); Htll v.
Sp1egel. Inc., 708 F.2d 233. 235 (6th Cir. 1983); Kolb v. Goldring, Inc.• 694 F2d 869. 872 (1st Cir.
1982); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 1·.2d 684, 687·88 (7th Cir. 1982); fiedler '· lndianhead Truck
Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir.
1981 ); Slatin '·Stanford Research lnst., 590 F.2d 1292, 1296 (4th Cir 1979): Dean v. Am. Sec. In\.
Co., 559 r.2d 1036, 1039-39 (5th Cir. 1977}; Rogers v. Euon Re~ean.:h & hng'g Co., 550 F2d 834.
841-42 (3rd Cir. 1977}. 8111 \te Nel\on v. Boatmen's Bunc\hares. lnc .. 26 f'.3d 796,802 (8th Cir. 1994)
(afftrming award of "compensatory" damages in amount of $74,811 under ADEA; this may have been
lo\t wages); Cooley'. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325. 1334-35 (6th Clr. 1994) (upholding award
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injunctive relief could include rcinstatement,s-t an order requiring that an
applicant be hired,55 front pay as an alternative to reinstatement,~ and/or
of S 5,000 for ··mental di,tre.,,:· apparently under ADEA. but note that plamtiff included claim under
Tenne,...:e Human Rlghts Act).
S-t. Su. t.g., Woodhou-.e v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248. 257-58 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the tnal court did not abu...: it-. discretion in ordering reinstatement. e'en though plaintiffs previoa'
posttion had been eliminated, becau'e evidence indicated she was qualified to maintain variety of jobs);
Ptullipp '. ANR Freight Sys., lnc.. 61 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no abu..e of
discretion in trial court'\ determination that reinstatement rather than front pay wa~ appropriate ab,ent
5h<N.1ng that remstatement "a~ e1ther impmcticable or tmpo,-.ible); James v. Se~. Roebuck & Co. 21
f .3d 9R9. 996-97 ( lOth Cir. 1994) (holding no abuse of di,cretion in ordering reinstatement m'tead of
front pa}. ab~enr a sho\\ing that ho,tility would make it un\1-orkahle; plaintjffs' refusal to accept
reirutatcmcnt precludes from pay); Brunnemann ' . Terr.J lot' I. Inc.• 975 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that absent evidence of animosity or ho-.tility. court did not abu-.e 11s discretion in reinstating
pl:untiff. even though his position has been filed b) someone ehe); Farber v. Massillon Bd. of Edu~.:.,
90~ F.2d 65,70-71, corrected at917 F.2d 1391, 1396-97 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that retnstatcment i~
clear!} preferred and. absent excepuonal circumstances carefully articulated in record. should be ordered
in,tead of from pay: workplace tensions insurficient unless they manifest them-ehe~ in public functions
of l!rnployer): Anderson v. Plulhp-. Petroleum Co.. 861 l-.2d 631. 638 ( 10th Cir. 1988) (holdmg
rein,tatement clearly appropriate instead of front pay where no hostility exi~ts. plruotiff could have been
tran,ferred to comparable position and plamtiff was at least 25 years from retirement; trial court must
ani.:ulate evidence and muonale for awardmg front pay).
55. See, t.R·· DickeNon v. Delu"-e Check Printen., Inc.. 703 F.2d 276. 279-80 (8th Cir. 1983);
Left"'ich v Harris-Sto\\e State College, 540 F. Supp. 37,45 (b. D. Mo. 1982), aff'd in part and rn'd in
parr on orhtr 1:rmmds, 702 F 2d 686, 693 (8th Cir. 1983 ).
56. See. e.g., Co"- v. Dubuque Bank & Tru" Co., 163 F.3d 492. 498-99 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding
that be! fore awarding front pay in lieu of reinstatement, trial court is required only to find the animosity
so extreme that it makes an amjcable and produc tive work relation,.rup tmpoS>.tblc, not that the
ammo~ity arises from discnminatory ammus); Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp.. 140 F.3d 335. 352-54
1 ht Cir. 1998) (holdmg that trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the defendant's po'>t-tnal
rnmllln a~kiog court to order the plaintiff reinstated in lieu of front pay; the court found that
reinstatement w~ "impracticable in the extreme" "'here the antipathy the emplo}er's top management
held for the plaintiff \l-ent heyond the animosity engendered by the litigation, the employer's vilification
of the plaintiff undennined hi-. 'alue a~ a manager, the plaintifrs supt:f\i~or would be the person \1-ho
had signed his discharge leuer, and the po~ition offered was indelinite and "make-work" and pan of
another strategtc move hy the employer); Newhou~e v. McCormick & Co.. Inc.. 110 !-.3d 635. 641-42
(8th Cir. 1997) (holdmg that trial court did not abuse its discretion in reJecting reinstatement where
plaintiff testified that he did not thmk he could go back to work for employer becnu~e of strained
relation~hip: fact that plaintiff Y.a.s rece•vmg Soctal Security retirement henefils due to his inability to
secure full-ume employment rendered reinstatement impractical): Weaver v. Amoco Prod. Co.. 66 !'.3d
85. 88-89 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court must articulate reason for it~ conclusion that
reinstatement wa.<, not feasible); Ray v. l uka Special Mun. Separ.ue Sch Dist., 51 f .3d 1246, 1253-55
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding no abuse of discretion in dcnymg remstatement, based on discord and
antagonism that would result and awarding front pay); Acrey v. Am Sheep Indus. A''"· 981 F.2d 1569,
1576 (lOth Cir. 1992) (holding that. ba...:d on defendant's hosuhty to\1-ard plaintiff. trial court properly
concluded relationship had been irreparably damaged and that producuve and amicable working
relationship "~ not feasible: thus award of front pay was not abuse of dtscretion); Price v. Marshall
Erdman & Assocs., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1992) (holdmg that after JUty rejected
emp(()yer's claun incompetence in finding for plaintiff. trial court cannot then rely on employer·~
conunumg belief of mcompetenee m denymg reinstatement; but reinstatement of high-level employee
performing discretionary functions could lead to con~tant judicial 'upervi\JOn and this justifies de mal of
rein,tatement unless front pay cannot be computed); Williams v. Valentec Kisco. lnc., 964 F2d 723,
729-30 (8th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1014 (1992) (holdtng that frulure of plaintiff to reque)t
reinstatement 10 pleadings is not absolute bar to award of front pay); ELOC v. Ccntuf} Broadcasting
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restoration of benefits. 57 Also, attorney fee\ may be awarded. 5M Because of
the limitations on the available relief, state employees seeking to enforce
the ADEA will want to consider the alternative, addressed in the next
section, of filing a ~tate court action.

Corp., 957 F.2d 1446. 1462-64 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding denial of reinstatement \\here 11 \\Ould have
dl\rupted opcr.tuon of radio \tatmn and displaced announcer\ cum:ntl) employed. but revcr.mg denial
of front pay); Reneau v. Wayne Griffin & Son,. Inc., 945 F.2d 869.870 (5th Car 1991) (holdmg that
award of front pay is appmpriate when rean,tatemem is not fea~ible. even where compl.unt did not
expressly ~ck front pay); Wil,on' S&L AcquJ\Illnn~ Co., L.P., 940 f .2d 1429, 1438 (lith Cir. 1991)
(holding that while trial court ha.~ broad discreuon to grant equitable relief. if it refu\C' such relief "it
mu\t carefully articulate its rationale;" here front pay 'hould have been awarded); Duke v. Uniroyal.
l.nc.. 92H F.2d 1413, 1421 24 (4th Cir. 1991)(holding that when remstatement 1~ not appropriate, front
pay is a\ rulable as remedy to avoid potential of future loss); Spulak v. K.Mart Corp., 894 F2d 1150.
1157-58 ( lOth C1r. 19901 (uphnldmg front pay award. even though remstatement preferred, ha.'ed on
plaintiffs asscrtaon that he would ha\e problems returning to managerial position becau\C he had been
humiliated in front of hi' employees and hecauo;e he feared retaliation based on what he t>b\Crved in the
paM); Brooks v. Woodhne Motor Freight. Inc, 852 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Car. 1988) (holding that
di'ttrict court did not abu'e its discretion in awarding front pay in lieu of reinstatement where there wa.~
~ubMantial animosity between parties and nature of bu,iness requared high de~ree of mutual trust and
confidence); Ana.\la~ao v. Schcring Corp., 838 F.2d 701, 70!1 (3rd Cir. 198!1) (holding front pay
dascretionary); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.• !136 F.2d 15.t4. 1553 (lOth Cir 19!18) (holding that
fron t pay appropriate where tensaon between plaintiff and defendant precludes reinstatement); Bruno v.
Wc~tern Elec. Co.. 829 F.2d 957. 966 (10th Cir. 1987) (findmg front pay available a~ a ..ubstitute for
rein~tatemenl.)

Wh1le it as clear that ln>nt pay is available under the ADEA. -whether thi' consututes pro,pective
equitable rehef for purpoo;es of the F.leventh Amendment is less clear. l.n actions under other statute,,
court~ have decided that front pay, in contmstto rem'tUllement, is barred b) the Eleventh Amendment.
Su, t>.g•• Campbell v Arkansas Dept. of Corr., 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Car. 19981; Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlam Corp.. 77 F. 3d 690, 697-98 (3rd Cir. 1996); Freeman v \1•ch1gan Dept. of State, 808
I .2d 1174. 1179 (6th Cir. 1987). Howc\er. the-,e caccs are \uspect becau.<.e they did not full:r explore
the nruure of front pay. \uch as the fact that it is an alternative to the preferred remedy of remstatemcnt
and i~ U\ually triggered by the employer·, as~rtion that remstatcment is not feasible for "-Cme reason,
such a~ animosity. If the plaintiff scel..s and as enutlcd to reinstatement.. but the court award' front pay
becau~ of the employer's resistance to reinstatement, the Eleventh Amendment should not bar the
alternative forn1 of relief invited by the employer. J ront pay, in th.s situation, ha> either been consented
to by the employer or it "'· like attorney fee,, ancillary to prospective injunctive relief Su infra note
58. In F.dt>lman '-Jordan. 415 US. 651 , 668 (1974), the Coun recogm1ed the pemusstble ··ancillary
effect on the state trea,ury" of prospective injuncti\c relief. ADEA plamtiff' should pur,ue
reinstatement and address front pay as an alternati\e only after the employer argues that. from lh
pe~pective. rem\tatement is not fea.,ible.
57 Sharkey v. La.,mo, 214 F.3d 371. 375 I 2nd Cir. 20001 (finding that plaintifl is ent1tled to lost
pension benefits, either as a form of equitable reltcf • lo>t ~rvice and ,aJary credits restored to his
pension plan -or an award of damages to compensate ham for the v·alue ol the lo~t pension benefits);
Danks v. Tr.t,elers Cos ., 180 F.3d 358. 365 (2nd Cir 1999) (holding that re\lorallon of benefits is
equitable relief and should be decided by judge, not jury). To les~n Eleventh Amendment concerns,
ADEA plaintiffs should \eek such relief as part of prospective equitable relief, e.g.. protecung a future
benefit.
511 Su 29 U.S C § 626(b). incorporating 29 U.SC § 216{b). Su also Bom: ...,STH'ER AND
LLv"SO,, STATL AND LOCAL GOVCR."!'.ff.' l C"·ll RIGHTS LtAiltUTY § 7:37 (1987 and 2000 Supp.).
The Eleventh Amendment doe' not bar a fee award becau'e fees are ancillary to pro~pecuve mJuncuve
relief. Mi~'ouri v. Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274.279-80 ( 1989). Su aho Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,69397 ( 1978).
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State Court Actions to Enforce the ADEA.

It appears counterintuitive that an individual's ability to enforce rights
provided by a federal statute such as the ADEA should depend on the state
in which the challenged employment decision is made, but this does seem
to be the effect of the Supreme Court decision in Alden.59 The Alden Court
held that Congress, in passing the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), did not
have the authority to mandate that states open their couru to lawsuits
brought under that Act.60 This decision marked another major ~tep by a
five-justice majority purportedly interested in restoring the proper balance
of power between the federal and state governments.61 The Court reasoned
that the Eleventh Amendment should not be read literally to bar only suits
against states in a federal forum. 62 Historically, the purpose of the
Amendment was to clarify that the Constitution did not alter the "universal''
doctrine that a sovereign cannot be sued without its consent.63 The Court
found no evidence in the text or history of the Constitution that the states
were required "to relinquish this portion of their sovereignty," and it saw no
basis to restrict the immunity based on the forum. 64 Thus, it concluded that
"the Constitution reserves to the states a constitutional immunity from
private suits in their own courts which cannot be abrogated by Congress."65
While the earlier decision of Howlett v. Rose66 indicated that the states
could not close their doors to Section 1983 claims67 by imposing a statecreated immunity,68 the Court in Alden emphasized that Howlett involved a
school board, not an arm of the state, and thus the constitutional defense of
sovereign immunity was not at issue.69 The Court in Howlett simply
rejected an immunity defense that would have been unavailable to the board
if the action had been brought in a federal forum. 70 Howlett, therefore,
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
/d. at 712.
61. /d. at 748 ("[Ojur federalism requires that Congress treat the State~ in a manner consistent
with thctr status a.\ residuary sovereign> and joint participants in the governance of the Nation."); /d. at
758 ("Congress mu~t accord States the esteem due to them as joint participant~ in a federal system.").
62. /d. at 736 ("[T]hc bare text of the Amendment is not an exhaustive de,cription of the States·
con,titutional immunity from ~uit").
6J. /d. at 715-16.
64. /d. at 731-48.
65. /d. at 739-40. The Court clarified that it was addressing only congress10naJ po\l.er under
Article I. It noted that Secuon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may confer broader authority. See 1d. at
756.
66. 496 u.s. 356 ( 1990).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 create~ a cause of action against persons acting under color of state law who
violate rights created by the Constitution or federal law. See ERWlS CHEMF.RJNSKY. FEDLRAL
JLRISDICTJOI'. 448 (1999). See also BODL.,.STFTNUAND LtVINSOS. supra note 58. ch. I.
6&. Howleu v. Ro">C, 496 U.S. at 380-81.
69. Alden, 527 U.S. at 740.
70. /d.
59.
60.
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cannot be read to mean that Congre~~ can open the state courts to suits
against state~. Rather, it means that state~ cannot discriminate against
federal claims and cannot change the scope of federally provided rights by
creating immunity barriers.7 1
Although rejecting congre~sional power to abrogate the states'
immunity from private suit in their own courts by Article I legislation, the
Court recognized that "sovereign immunity bars suit~ only in the absence of
con-.,ent."72 It proceeded summarily to conclude, however, that Maine had
not waived its immunity from suit to enforce the FLSA in its own courts
because the Maine judiciary adheres to the general rule that "a specific
authority conferred by an enactment of the legislature is requisite if the
sovereign is to be taken as having shed the protective mantel of
immunity."7 ·1 Although Maine had consented to certain classes of o;uits
while maintaining its immunity from others, there was no evidence that the
State had ''manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate
against federal causes of action."74 Applying the Alden analysis to ADEA
claims, it appears clear that state courts may look to their own law on
·overeign immunity in detennining whether there has been a waiver
regarding federal claims, but states cannot discriminate "in a systematic
71. ld at 754-55. Although the Coun in Alden notes that Congre~~ ha.' broader power to authoru.e
private suits against non-consenting States pul'\uant to tiS Section 5 enforcement power, the Court's
holding~ in Bo~rn~. Florida Sa~·mgs Bank and Kimel suggeM that even legislation enacted under Section
5 is in jeopardy 1f 11 docs not meet the restrictive "congruence and proporuonality'' te\t. See discussion
of the~ case<. and their application to the ADA, infra note~ 95- 121 and accompanymg text.
72. /d. at 755. States may also waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
coun. but the Supreme Coun has emphasized that an) con~cnt to suit mu'it be "unequivocally
expres~d" Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 ( 1974). Thus, in Florida D~pl. of Health v. Florida
Numn~ Hom~ Asl'n, 450 U.S. 147 ( 1981 ). the Coun held that even though Florida la.... specifically
provided that the Department of Health was a "body corporate" with the capacity to ~uc and be sued,
thts provision wa1vcd only the State'' common law so~ere1gn 1mmunity, not ih constitutionaJ immunity
from suit in federal coun under the Eleventh Amendment. S1m1larly. California' s general consent to
suit, ab>ent a specific waiver applicable to federal eoun. would not eliminate the Eleventh Amendment
problem. Atascadero St.lte Hosp. ' . Scanlon, 473 V S. 234, 241 (1985}. These cases suggest that a
state'' general waiver of sovereign immunity may 'UhJCCt it to suit in state court, but that a more
stringent s1.1ndard is apphed to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. To date, only one \t.ltc has
broadly WBJved it' Eleventh Amendment immunny. Su Grotta ' State of Rhode hland, 711 I F.2d 343.
347 (l st Cir. 1986) (holding that State'\ highc~t coun has authoritatively found that Rhode Island law
was mtended to wruvc 1mmumty from suit in federal court}. Thus, federal dist'Timmauon claims agamst
state employers in Rhode hland may be pul'\ued m a federal forum, all hough because of the Supreme
Coon's later ruhng in Will v. Michigan, 1upra note 21 , the St.ltc itself cannot he named as u defendant in
a Section 19!13 sutt. Watver will also be found m a ~pec1fic case where the 'tate falls to object and
proceeds 10 respond to the complaint. Su, e.g., In re Jackson, 184 F.3d 1046, 104!1-50 (9th Cir. 1999}
(holding that California Fnmchise Tax Board waived it\ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it filed u
proof or cia1m for unpaid state income taJtes in a bankruptcy proceeding); Hill v. Bhnd Indus. & Servs
of \<turyland. 179 F.3d 754, 758-763 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that by defending the case on the merits
and proc.:eedmg to trial. slate agency unequivocally ind1cated its consent to the jurisdiction of the feder.tl
coun and waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity).

n
74

Alden, 527
/d. at 758.

u.s at 757-58, Citing Cushing\'. Col~fl. 420 A.2d 919. 923 (Me. 1980).
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fashion'' against federal claims when they waive their immunity. Aside
from these two principles, the Court's abbreviated analysis of the state
waiver i sue has provided little guidance to state court .
Since Alden leaves the state courts free to determine their own
immunity law as long as they do not discriminate, a state that traditionally
follows a specific waiver rule could decide that ADEA rights can be
enforced in state court only if the state has waived its immunity to age
discrimination claims. Some courts in the wake of Alden have interpreted
their immunity law to require plain, clear, and unmistakable language
regarding consent to FLSA claims.75 On the other hand, a state with a
statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment by l-.tate government,
and providing a right of action in tate court to enforce the law, could not
close its courts to ADEA claims against the state. To do so would violate
the anti-discrimination principle set forth in Howlett and Alden. In Howlett,
the Court empha ized that under the Supremacy Clause, state courts have a
responsibilit) to enforce federal law "in the ab ence of a valid excuse," and
concluded that there is no valid excuse for discriminating against federal
law. 76 The petitioners in Alden argued Maine had di criminated against
federal right!, in violation of Howlett, because the state waived its
sovereign immunity with respect to certain statutol) wage and hour
pro\isions while refusing to waive its immunity from suit with regard to
FLSA's wage and hour provisions.
Although the Supreme Court
summarily concluded that the State had not "manipulated its immunity in a
systematic fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action," it is
important to note that the Maine Supreme Court found no waiver because
the state statute explicitly excluded public employees from the state· s
overtime provision.77 The Maine Supreme Court, in fact. acknowledged
that under state law "a legislative waiver of the sovereign'· immunity from
suit may be found implicit in a general cheme plainly contemplating that
the State will become party to certain kinds of contracts," but it concluded

75. For example, m l.tmson 1·. Un11·ulity ofTtnllt\\rt', 2000 'W1 116312 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
the court held that a tarute allowing the Tenne~..ce Claim~ CommJ\\IOn to cntcrtam suits against the
\tate by employee~ claurung c.lc:privation of ~tatutory rights under Tenne~o..ee law could not provide the
ba.,is for bringing an Fl.SA chum. The euun rca-.oned that under Tcnne,o.,ee law. any legi~lation
authori1ing su1L' uguinst the ~tate, \l,hether for monetary or declaratory relief. had to contain plain. clear
and unmistakable language "as to lea\e nothmg to sunni'e or conjecture." The coun rca\oncd that the
lcgl',laturc expressly allowed the Chums Commission to ibSUine juri~iction onJ) for claims alleging
deprivation of state statutory rights, not fcdeml rights. Although arguably this pcnnit~ the Claim\
Commission Ill discriminate again<,! federal \tatutory cla1m~. the coun nonetheless concluded that the
statutory scheme creating the Claim\ Commi~~ion could not be interpreted to reflect suue waiver of i~
sovereign immunlly to FLSA claims.
76. 496 U.S. at 369-81. Su also McKnett v. St. Louh & S.F R. Co.. 292 U.S. 230. 233-3~
( 19:l4) ("The federal Constituuon proh1birs state couru of general Juno;diction from rcfu,ing !to hear a
en~] 'olely bccauo..e the su1t b brought under a federal law.-).
77. Alden v. Maine. 715 A.2d 172, 175 (Me. 1998).
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that an implied waiver cannot be found when the legislature makes an
unambiguous statement preserving the State's sovereign immunity from
suit. 7 ~

The concept of implied state waiver of its immunity may mean that
litigan~ will have a state forum for vindicating federal statutory rights even
when the doors to the federal courts have been closed. The Seventh Circuit
has indeed acknowledged the a\ailability of a state forum regarding claims
brought against the State of lilinois under the Americans with Disabilities
Act. In Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities
for Northeastem Illinois University, 79 it concluded that although the ADA
was not a valid abrogation of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit in a federal forum, the plaintiff could proceed in state court. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that "although states may implement a blanket
rule of sovereign immunity, Illinois has not done this."80 To the contrary,
111inois had opened its courts to claims based on state law, including state
laws prohibiting disability discrimination by units of state government, and
thus Tllinois could not exclude claims based on federal law. Because
lilinois had a specific statute prohibiting disability discrimination, the court
did not address the question whether a more general waiver would suffice.
However, states without an age discrimination statute, or with a statute that
provides for administrative enforcement only, will not have to hear ADEA
claims against the state. This result is ironic in light of Justice O'Connor's
statement in Kimel that cutting off claims under the ADEA does not leave
state employees without a remedy since they are "protected by state age
discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from their state
employers, in almost every State of the Union."81 In those states that
provide no meaningful remedy for age discrimination under state law, the
absence of a state remedy may actually provide the justification for cutting
off the federal ADEA remedy in a state forum. This narrow approach

71!. /d. at 175-76, citmg Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541, 545 .
79. 207 F.3d 945. 952 (7th Cir. 2000).
80. /d.
81. Kimel v. Aorida Bd. of Regen~. 528 U.S 62, 91 (2000). Justice O'Connor's li't of ~tate
\latutcs in Kimel, 528 U.S at 92 n. • is mtsleading. 1:or eumple. Indiana has a law prohibiting age
dic;..:rimination. IND. Com,;§ 22-9-2- 1, n uq., but tn defining who is d covered employer the act
spcctfically excludes any person or government enuty that " subject to the ADEA. Thus, m any case
where the ADI.:.A upplie~. there ts no ~tate cause of action for age discnm.mation in employment. Su
Ketti v. Lever Bros. Co.. 563 1 Supp. 230, 233-34 (N D. Ind. 1983) (holding that because suit could he
brought under federal law. relief under state law is una\ailahle: therefore, Indiana is not a deferral state
for purposes of the ADEA and age bias claims in lndtana are governed b) the 'honer 180-day
limitations period). Alter Kim~/. the critical question 1s how to interpret the 'tatutory exclusion of
employers '\ubject to the federal age dic;crimination in employment act." I'll). COOl!§ 22-9-2-1. If. as
this anicle contend,, the ADEA i' valid as an enactment under the Commerce <.lause-the EEOC rna)
enforce the Act in fedeml coun and Indiana state couns may entertam ADEA sut~ against a state
cmployer-stllte emplo)ers arc villi "subject to" the federal law and the state remedy is vtill unavailable.
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appears to be the position adopted by a few states interpreting their waiver
law in the context of post-Alden FLSA claims brought in state court. 8 ~
States which have traditionally recognized a broader waiver principle
should not be permitted to cut off federal statutory claims. Litigants should
carefully research state law to determine whether it generally allows
plaintiffs to sue the state.83 Although the Supreme Court in Alden

82. Su Lawson, supra note 75. Also in Virginia v. Luzik, 524 S.E.2d 871 (Va. 2000), the Virginia
Supreme Court ruled that only action by the state legislature, and not the conduct of an attorney for the
commonwealth, cnuld constitute a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity and consent to FLSA suitl>.
Many states share thi' view. 72 AMJLR STATF.S § 119 (1974, 1999 Supp.) The court then rejected the
notion that the legislative waiver of immunity regardtng debts owed under a contractual relationship
could be construed to include claims for unpaid wages by state employees. The court reasoned that even
if the ~tate waiver statute could be extended to allow FLSA actions, the sutt "wa' not brought in tbe style
of a contract claam or in the manner pre,cribed for such claims by the statutory scheme.'' fd. at 207.
Invoking Alden's assertiOn that \0\ ereign immunity was a right reserved to the states by the United
States Constitutton, the court refu;ed to give a broad interpretation to what 11 dcl>Cribed a.s a hmtted
waiver o f sovereign immunity. /d. at 208. Similarly. in Allen v. Fau1·er, 742 A.2d 594 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000}, the court held that Ne\\ Jen.ey's Contractual Liability Act, pursuant to whach !lie\\
Jersey waived tl\ so~ere1gn immunity from liability for claims arising from contract di\putes, would not
constitute the state's waaver of actions brought under the FLSA. First, the court reasoned that plaintiffs
characterized the defendant\' obligation\ to them as "quasi-contractual," and the statute specifically
e~cludcd the state'' liability for contr.tcts implied in law. Additionally, the court ruled that even if the
act could be construed as wa1ving immumty for FLSA claim~. 1l required lihng a nouce of claim within
90 days, and thus the plaintiffs claim was time-barred.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Alden dictates that state law i' critical in asses~ing the
wruver issue. the notice que\tion i~ less clea r. In Ftlder v. Casey, 4!!7 U.S. 131 (19!!8), the Supreme
Court held that plamuff<> need not comply with state notice requirements as a precondition to bringing a
Section 1983 suit in state court. The Court rea.~oned that the notice provision conflicted with the
remedial objectives of Section 1983, and thus wa.~ pre-empted under the Supremacy Clause. See also
Rogers v. Saylor, 760 P.2d 232, 238-39 ( 1988) (holding that Oregon statute that places cap on general
damages and precludes puniu ve damages tn ton actions agam\t a state cannot be applied to Section 1983
actions brought in a state forum). Superficially, the analysi\ in Felder appears to conflict with that in
Alden. In Felder, the Court re~oned that although state procedural rules apply to federal claims brought
in state coun, it also found that the state notice-of-claim statute is "more than a mere rule of
procedure ... the statute JS a substantive condJ!Jon on the nght to sue governmental officials and
entities." 487 U.S. at 152. On the other hand, by defimtion Section 1983 claims cannot be brought
agam.,t a >tate, see Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 ( 1989). and thu.' Felder and its
progeny do not addre\\ the newly invigor,Jled state sovereign irnrouruty question.
83. See, e.g. Bachmeier v. Hoffman, I P.3d 1236, (Wyo. 2000). concluding that the State had
"'aived its sovereign immuOJt)' from an FLSA claim by enacting a limited waiver of immunity under the
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.
The is.,ue of state waiver may be quite complex. For example, the lnd1ana Supreme Court broadly
abrogated common law sovereign immunity in 1972 and held that lnd1ana could be liable in damage., for
a breach of duty owed to a private individual. Campbell v. State, 284 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ind. 1972}. See
a/.w Burr v. Duckworth, 547 F. Supp. 192, 195 (N.D.lnd. 1982) (ho lding that Indiana no longer adheres
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity and thus generally the state cannot assert immunity from habihty
in state court proceedings for damages re~ulting from the exercise of proprietary or governmental
functions). Although thi\ appear\ straightforward, the Indiana Supreme Court in Campbell cautioned
that sovere1gn ammunity remains a viable doctrine for j ud1cial and legislative governmental activities,
and also cited as authoritall\ e the ba.,ic principle that sovereign immunity conunues to exist for
d•scretionary acts or omissions. fd. Indiana courts, however, have interpreted the di'>Cretionary function
exception quite narrowly, and these decisions should not forecloo,e employee' from bringing age
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recognized that a state may "consent to certain classes of suits while
maintaining its immunity from others,"84 the question will be how broadly
or narrow!)' the "class" of suiLs is defined under state la\\ . For example,
under a broad interpretation the availability of workers' compensation
claims, wage claims, unemployment compensation claims, wrongful
discharge claims or any other statutory or common law claims against state
government would be sufficient to open the door to ADEA claims.
Although the State of Maine allowed orne wage suits by state employees,
its highe t court determined that since tate law specifically excluded public
employees from the overtime provision, Maine had not waived its immunity
from state or FLSA actions seeking overtime wages even if it recognized
the doctrine of implied waiver. 11~ The Supreme Court in Alden did not

discrimination claims against a state employer. For example, in Orem ~·. l~·y Tech Statt! Collt!ge, 711
N.E.2d 1!64 (Ind. App. 1999), the coun permitted u suit against a state college for breach nf contract On
the other hand, Orrm suggeMs that age discrimmation claims may be characteri£ed as torts ~ince indiana
law broadly defines a tort as "a legal wrong committed upon a pe!"'>on or propert) mdependcnt of
contract" ld. atl!6!!. Further. lndtana courts have ruled th:u employee, allegmg "retahatory discharge"
arc. in es'>ence, bringmg a claim that wuods m tort. B1cn1 v. Bloom, 674 N.E.2d 99!1, 1002-03 lind
App. 1996) (holding that retaliatory di~chargc ol an al will employee gl\·es nse to a cau-.e of action m
tort, rather than a claim for breach of contract).
Tht~ chamctcriution i~ important hecausc the lnd1ana legislature enacted the Ton Cla1ms Act. IND.
CODE§ 34-13-3-1. t'f st'q., in respon-.e to Glmpbdl and thi~ Act impo-.e~ several re'>trictioDS on
government hahility. hN. H grants immunity ~A here the loss re~ull\ from certain li~tcd acti\ itie\, most
importantly "'the performanc.: of a discretionary fun.:tion ," thus cod1fying the common law notion
referred to in Campbt!ll. bo. Coot § 34-13-3-3(6). Second. the Act requires that for any cla1m aga1n~1
the state, notice mu\l he filed within 270 days after the loss occurs,lND. CODE:. § 34-11-3-6 (Mating that,
as to other political ~uhdivt~lons, notice must be tiled within 180 days, hl> COOL § 34- 13-3-8). Third.
the Act impo\Cs limitations on liahility, i.e.. a cap on compen~atory damage& and a pmhibttion on any
puniti~e darruges again5t governmental entities.
CooF § 34-13-3-4.
The first restriction, the "discretionary function .. exception, should not be a problem with regan! to
particularized employment deCI\IOns. Jn Pt!avlu ~·. Mtmrot! Cit.~ Board ofCommissionus, 528 N.E.2d
40 (Ind. 1981!), the Indiana Supreme Coun ruled that the discretionary funcuons exception "insulate~
only tboo;c s1gnificant policy and political decision~ which cannot be as>oCssed by customary ton
\t.tndards:· /d. at 45. The court emphasized that, "discretionary immunity must be narrowly con..trued
because it is an cJtception to the general rule of liahility." /d. at46. Immunity is jusulicd only where the
tort involves basic planning and policymaking functions. and the go~emment bears the burden of
showing that a polic} decision where ri~ks and benefits must he balanced hu' occurred. ld at 47. St't'
also DH \.Worthington Banc,hares, Inc , 728 N.E.:!d 899, 903 (Ind. App. 2000) (deterDllmng whether
a go,emmcnt act is discretmnary, lnd1ana court~ apply a plann1ng te\1 and asJ.. whether the challenged
act1molve~ "the formulations ofha,ie policy charo~ctcrized by official judgment, di,creuoo. ~Acighing of
altemaU\e~. and puhlic policy choices.").
In short, lndtana court' 'hould be open to ADLA ~u11!. becau e the state has adopted a hroad waiver
theory, limited onl> by specific ~latutcs. such as the Indiana Ton Cla1ms Act, which are to bc narrow!)
construed; and employment claims. even if characterited as tort actions. do not fall within any of the
'wtutory exceptions to the Ton Cla1ms Act. Litiganb ~hould note, however, that wa1ver of 'overe1gn
immunity may be conditiOned on compliance with the terms of a specific \tatute, and thus notice
provision and other re\tncuons ~hould he strictly observed State couns have noted the-.e limitation'
~Aith regard 10 FLSA clatms. See cases d1\cu~~cd .111pm note 82.
84. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,758 (1999).
85. Alden\ . State, 715 A.2d 172. 175 (Me. 1998).
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address the specifics of Maine law, but the opinion suggests that states will
be given broad discretion in deciding when they will consent to suit, absent
evidence "the state has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to
di...criminate against federal causes of action."86 Although the Alden Court
noted that "fm]any States, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes
consenting to a wide variety of suits," thus purportedly mitigating the
''rigors of sovereign immunity", the decision has been read by some states
a~ an invitation to adopt a restrictive approach to the waiver issue. 87
Nonetheless, in those states that have taken a less stringent approach to state
'overeignty, it may be argued that since civil rights claims are often viewed
as analogous to state tort claims,88 a broad waiver of governmental
immunity from state tort claims should be sufficient to open the door to a
federal statutory claim to enforce the ADEA. 89
This battle will have to be fought in the state courts. Based on Alden,
the courts of each state will have to determine whether the state has waived
its immunity to an ADEA claim. Presumably, the determination of the
highest state court could be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court only if
there is a federal question, e.g., whether there is a discrimination problem.90
On the other hand, if a state decides that waiver of general tort immunity
opens its doors to ADEA claims, there would be no basis for Supreme
Court review.91

86. Altlen. 527 U.S. at 758.
87. !d. at 755. Tn the wake of Aldtn, some state courts have overruled earlier decisions rejecting a
\Overeign immunity defen~e to federal fl..SA chums. Set, e.g., Lawson v. University of Tennessee,
2000 WL 116312, di\CUS\I!d supra note 75. In this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a state
employee's action under the FLSA in ~tate court was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
but that ruling. the court now reasoned. was premised on a belief - since discredited b} Alden - that
Congress validly \\aJved the 'tate's immunity. /d. at 3. Others courts, such as the Virginia Supreme
Court. have relied on Aldtn to JUMify a restrictive interpretation of the waiver 1ssue. Su Virginia v.
Luz1l.., supra note 82.
HH. Wilson v. Garcia. 471 U.S. 261. 268-70 (1985). Su also discussion of Indiana law. supra
note 83.
89. The federal couns have taken this position when state \O~ereign immunity defenses have been
raised as a defense to Section 1983 clatm,. Su. e.g., Bishop v. John Doe No.1, 902 F.2d 809. 810 (lOth
Cir. 1990) (holding that state con-.entto suit in its tort claims acts allows federal c1vil rights actions to be
commenced 111 state courts, though not in federal court); Weller v. Dept of Soc. Serv's. for Baltimore.
90 I F.2d 387. 397 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the State's waiver of sovereign immunity in tort claims
preclude~ this defense in § 1983 actions brought 111 state court); Giancola v. State of W. Virgima Dept.
or Pub. Safet), 830 F.2d 547,552 (4th Cir. 1987) (holdtng that, although insufficient to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity, general waiver of sovereign immunity subjects State to suit under Section 1983
111 \tate court). Although the Supreme Court in Will, supra note 82, has now ruled that state~ are not
>ubject to suit under Secuon 1983 because Congres\ d1d not intend to include them under that statute,
the di!>CU\sion of state waiver Ia\\ is still valid.
90. Murdocl.. v. City of Memphis. 87 U.S. 590 ( 1875).
91. Michigan'· Long, 463 U.S. 1032. 1039-40 (1983).
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Suits by the EEOC

The ADEA gives the EEOC authority to bring actions to enforce the
rights of private individuals92 and, in such actions, the full range of ADEA
relief is available.9-' Kimel does not change the feasibility of such actions
brought by the EEOC because the 1974 amendment to the ADEA extending
it to state and local government is a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce
Clause power,l).l and because suits by the EEOC are not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.95 In an analogous situation, the Supreme Court in
Alden explicitly recognited that the FLSA remains enforceable against state
government in actions brought by the U.S. Department of Labor.96
The decision in Kimel suggests that the EEOC should make actions on
behalf of state government employees a priority in order to promote the
intention of Congress to end age discrimination in employment by state
government. While the EEOC obviously cannot devote all of its litigation
resources to ADEA claims against state government employers, these suits
should become a priority because the Kimel limitations on private
enforcement do not affect state employees with other discrimination
claims,9" except possibly state employees with ADA claims.

III.
PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYERS TO ENFORCE FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS
OF PERSONS WITH A DISABILITY

A.

Kimel Should not Control the ADA.

In view of the Court's recent federalism decisions, including those
dealing with the Eleventh Amendment, it is likely that the result in the
pending ADA case98 will be controlled by Kimel. Prior to Kimel, several

9~. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)' 1); 29 C.ER. § 162615(aX8). HoweH:r, commencement of an action by
the EEOC tcnmnates the nghtto bring a pnvate acuon. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)( I l see also Seuino v. City of
Chtcago, 642 F Supp. 755, 751! (N.D. 111. 1986); Jones v. City of Jonesville, Wi... , 488 F. Supp. 795. 797
(0 Wi.,_ 1980) ("[C]Iearly Congrc~' mtended to bar an individlLll ' uit under the ADEA when the EEOC
had already commenced suit.'').
9~
Stt', t.g.. EEOC v. O'Grady, 857 F.2d 383. 386 (7th Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Prudential Fed Sav.
& Loan Admm.. 763 F.2d 1166. 1171-73 (10th Cir 1985), cert. dmitd, 474 U.S. 946 (1985): Jone!> v.
City of Jonewtlle. Wis .. 488 F. Supp. 795. 797 (D. Wi,. 1980).
94. Stt supra note 20.
9S. Aldtn, 527 U.S. at 759-60.

96.

ld.

97. Fitzpatrick"· Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holdmg that, in extending Title VIJ of Lhe Civil
Righb Act of 1964 to ~tate government employer<;, Congress abrogated their Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
91!. Su .~upro note II.
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circuits had ruled that Congress acted within its power in extending the
ADA to include state and local government employers. Decisions from the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
all held that the ADA was appropriately enacted by Congress under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.99 Only the Eighth Circuit had clearly
ruled otherwise. 100 Since Kimel, however, some courts have begun to
reevaluate the issue. For example, in Erickson v. Board of Governors of
State Colleges and Uni,·ersities for Northeastern Illinois University, 101 the
Seventh Circuit reversed its position and concluded that Title I of the ADA
was not authorized by the enabling clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it goes beyond the rationaJ basis test that applies to distinctions on
the ground of disability and "presumptively forbid[<.,] consideration of
attributes that the Constitution permits states to consider." 101 Other lower
courts have found this analysis persuasive. 103
There is, however, a strong argument that this result is not dictated by

Y9. Muller v. Co\tello, 187 F.3d 298. 307-1 1 (2d Cir. 1999) (holdmg thai Congn:~' properly
abmgated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in enactmg the ADA); Ycskcy v. Penn\ylvania
Dept. of Com., Ill! F-ld 168. 172-73 (3d Cir. 1997) (holdmg that prisoner may ~el.. inJunctive relief
agam\1 the state under Title II of the ADA); Amos v. Maryland Do:pt. of Pub. Safety & Corr Sen'-· 178
F.Jd 212.216-23 (4th Ctr. 1999), r~h granted ~n bane, judgment vacated (Dec. 28. 1999) (holdmg that
the ADA ;, valid exercise of Congre"' po"'er under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thth
there is no Eleventh Amendment protection from \uit by disabled state pri,oner...), Coolbaugh v.
Luui,iana, 136 F.3d 430, 441 5th Cir.), ctrt. denietl, 525 U.S. 819 (1998) (rcJectmg Eleventh
Amendment immunil) defense); Cro~wford v. lndiana Dept of Corrs., 115 F.3d 481. 487 (7th Ctr 19971
(holding that Title ll of the ADA wa' validly enacted under Congres~· Secllon 5 power), Dare v.
California. 191 F.3d 1167, 1173-76 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA i~ valid exercise of
congrl!\\ional authority, and thus 'u11 1s permitted under Title Ill; Mill'tin v. Kansas. 190 F.3d 1120,
1125·28 (lOth Cir. 1999) (holdmg that the ADA's abrogation of Ele\enth Amendment immunity was a
vahd exerdo,e of Congress' Sccuon 5 po'.l-er). Seaborn v, flonda Dept. of Corrs., 143 F. 3d 1405, 1407
( l ith Cir. 1998) (upholding Title ll claim).
100. Ahbrook v. City of Maum!!lle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005-10 (8th Cir. 1999), em. ~rallied, 528 U.S
1146, dismissed, 120 S Ct 1265 (2000) (holdmg that Congre" lacked the power to abrogate \tale
immunity under Title U of the ADA): Do:Bo-e v. Nebro ka. 186 F.3d 1087, 1088 (8th Cir 19991
(extending Alsbrook to include chums brought under Title I of the ADA). Note that although the Fourth
Circuit in Amos, supra note 99, generally upheld congres~ional waiver, in 8m11n 1'. Nonh Carolina
Diwsion of Motor V~hicl~s. 166 F.3d 698, 705-0ii (4th Cir. 19991. 11 mvalidaled an ADA regulation
proh1bitmg public entities from charging a fee to cover co~t.. of "acce\\ibility programs because it
found this did not fall within the remedial '-Cope of Congre ' enforcement po'l-er.
101. 207 F.3d 945, 952 (7th Cir. 2000).
102. Jd. at 949. The Eighth Circuli ha.s reaffirmed ih previous holdings that both Tule I and Title II
o f the ADA cannot be uMained under the abrogation doctnne. Walker v. Missoun Dept o f Corr~.• 213
F.3d I 035 (8th Cir. 2000). See a/.w Lav1a v. Penn~ylvania Dept. of Corrs.. 224 F. 3d 190 (3' Cir. 2000)
(holding that ADA not valid under Secuon 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
103. In Cooley v. Missis.~ippi Dept. of Transp.. 96 r Supp.2d 565 <S D Ml\s. 2000). the court
predicted that 1f again faced with the issue, the Fifth Circuli "'ould follow the Seventh Circuit'~ lead in
Erickson and hold that \tale' are immune from damages \Uih under the ADA Compar~ NemaM v.
Texas, 217 f .3d 275. 280-82 (5 Ctr. 2000) (assuming the ADA as a '1-bole IS w1thm the Section 5
power of Congre>s, a rcgulauon that goe, beyond requiring states to pro' ide access to their fac1htu~s and
program' e:~~cee<b Section 5 power).
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Kime/. 104 The ultimate question of congressional power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment turns on whether the substantive requirements
of a statute are proportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that the statute
has targeted.t 05 In determining that the ADEA failed this test, the Supreme
Court in Kimel emphasized three factors: (1) the Supreme Court has never
found age di-;crimination to be in violation of the equal protection clause; 106
(2) the legi ·lative record did not identify constitutional violations either
generally or specificaJly by state government; 07 and (3) the remedy
imposed by the ADEA w~ disproportionate to any problem identified. 108
The ADA can be distinguished on all three grounds.
In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, lnc., 100 the Supreme Court
struck down a local ordinance that unconstitutionally discriminated against
the mentally retarded by requiring a c;pecial use permit for a group home for
their use, even though such a permit was not required for many similar
uses. 110 Although the Court insisted that rational basis review governs
disability claims, it determined the permit requirement "rested on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." 111 A close reading of the
decbion reveals that the Court, in essence, subjected the city's proffered
reasons in defense of the ordinance to careful scrutiny, concluding that
irrational fear and prejudice are not sufficient justifications for disability

t04. The Second Circuli in Kilrullt>n ''· Ntw YorJ.. Stott> Dept. of wbor, 205 F. 3d 77 !2d C1r 2000),
reartinnc:d us pre-Kiml'l holding that the ADA wa..~ a valid congressional abrogauon ot Ele\enth
Amendment immunity Similarly. in Botosa11 '.Paul MrNally Rtalty. 216 F.3d 827 (9th Cir 2000). the
coun arlinnc:d the Ninth Circuit's prc-Kimt>l holdmg that the ADA is a valid c:>.en:1-.e of Congrc.,s'
power under Scdmn 5 of the Founecnth Amendment. Su also Ci~neros v. Wilwo, 226 F.3d II 13 ( I 0'
Cir, 2000) (rcaftlnmng the Coun's pre-K1mel holdmp); Davis~ . Utah State Tax Comm'n, 96 F Supp
.2d 1271. 1279 ID Utah 2000) (finding that Kimt>l did not alter the: Tenth C1rcuit po~itton that Congre''
validly abrogated the: Eleventh Amendment in enacting the ADA); Schall v Wichita State Univ . 7 P.3d
1114. 1157 (Kan 20001 ("Recent trend~ would lead us to believe the Supreme Court will hold the ADA
i\ a congruent <~nd proponional cxen:i'c: of Congrc~~· enforcemc:nl power; under§ .5 of the l·ouneenth
Amendment, thereby abrogaung Kan,as' <overcign immunity .'"); Jonc., '· Penru.ylvanHI. 1\o. ClV, A.
99-4212. 2000 \VL 15073 (L.D. Pa. 2000> (holding that Ele,enth Amendment oller.; no protection to
\tate' from the ADA and a '\trong maJOnty" ha' held likewi~); l.ev.is v.l\ew Mex1co Dept. of Health.
94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1228- 1229 (D. Nev. Mexico 2()()()) (di\lmgui~lung K11nel and holding Title II ol
the ADA is a valid cxercio,e of Congress' Section 5 powc").
105
Kimel v. nonda Rd. of Regents, 528 US 62. 83 (2000).
101\. Vance'· Bradley. 440 U.S 93,97 (1979) (holding that federal law that mandated reuremenl at
age 60 tor panicipant' in the Foretgn Service Retirement Sy~tem was rational bccau~ Congress could
rca..<Onably believe that conditions ove=a' are more demandmg); Ma~sachusctt' Retirement Bd. v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307.315 (1976) (finding that \tate: law that requ1red police: office!'\ to retire at age 50
wa., rational since phy,1cal ability generally declines with age).
107. Kiml'i. 528 U.S. at 89 90.
W!l. /d. at 90-91.
109. 473 l'.S. 43:!. (1985). Compare Heller ,., Doe by Doc, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (upholdmg
Kentucky's diflerenl standards for involuntary commitment of mentally retarded and mentally ill).

110. 473 U S. at 450.
Ill. /d.
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di,crimination. 112 The Court in Kimel observed that the elderly are less
likely to be singled out for unconstitutionally discriminatory treatment
because all persons who live out their normal life ~pan will experience old
age. 10 In contrast, our society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities.
The second way to distinguish Kimel is to look at the legislative
findings supporting the ADA. The Supreme Court in Kimel determined that
the legislative record did not reveal either a pattern of age discrimination
committed by the states or "any discrimination whatsoever that [rises] to the
level of constitutional violation." 14 The House report on the ADA
indicated that "inconsistent treatment of people with disabilities by state or
local government agencies is both inequitable and illogical."" ~ The
congressional finding~ refer to perva~ive discrimination againc;t persons
with disabilities by many institutions that are controlled to a significant
degree by state and local government, uch as education. health services,
and transportation. 116 In Erickson, Judge Wood noted in a dissenting
opinion that the congressional findings regarding disability discrimination
"explain in painstaking detail 'the extent of the evil." 117 Further, since the
Supreme Court in Clebume, in fact, stated that the task of determining
appropriate treatment of the disabled was one for the legislature, 118 Judge
Wood argued that deference should be given to the congressional judgment.
Thus. unlike the ADEA where Congress did not identify "any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of con'>titutional
violation," 119 Congress compiled an immense legislative record
demonstrating the severit.> and pervasiveness of discrimination against
people with disabilities.
Third, unlike the ADEA which prohibits all age-ba ed employment
di'>crimination against per~ons in the protected class. the ADA is a much
more proportional response to the problem of disability di~crimination. An
employer is entitled to treat a disabled person differently if there is no
reasonable accommodation that will permit the individual to do the job. As
Judge Wood explains in Erickson, "while an employer discriminating on
the basis of age must demonstrate that it would be 'highly impractical' not
to do so, an employer making distinctions on the basis of disability need

ld
Ktmt>l. 528 U.S. at 83 85.
/d.
II.R. Rep. l':o 10 1-485 (LI ). at 37 ( 1990). rt>printed in U.S.C CAN 3 19.
42 L .S.C. § 12 10 1(a)( 1).
117. Erickson v. Board of Governors of SUite College' and Univ. for Northea.,tem Ill. Univ.. 207
F.3d 945. 958 (7th Cir 2000).
I ll\. /d. at 957-58. citmg Cft>bumt>. 473 U.S at 442-43.
119
Kimel v Flonc.Ja Bd of Rcgcntl>, 528 U.S 62. 89 (2000).
11 2.

113.
114.
115.
116.

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPWYMENT & LABOR L4 W

124

[Vol. 22:99

only show that 'rea~onable steps' of accommodation, such as modifying
work schedules, training materials, facilities, or policies, will not work." 120
Wood concludes that the incorporation of this reasonable standard in the
duty to accommodate is "essentially a legislative incorporation of the
proportionality test required under the Constitution." 121
In short, the ADA only prohibits discrimination against "qualified
individuals," and it requires only "reasonable accommodations" that do not
impose an "undue burden" on the employer. 122 Further, the Court in Kimel
recognized the well-established principle that legislation that deters or
remedies constitutional violations is permitted even if it reaches some
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional provided Congress is not
making a substantive constitutional change. 23 The Kimel Court did not
announce a new test for analyzing whether Congress appropriately
exercised its Section 5 enforcement power in abrogating states' immunity.
In fact, it cited case precedent that the circuits had already considered when
they determined that the ADA was valid} 24 There is no reason for these
circuits to switch their position based on Kimel.
For these reasons, the Court should hold that Congress' prohibition of
disability discrimination by state governments as employers is within its
power conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and that,
therefore, Congress' clear abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in
suits under the ADA is valid}~ Such a ruling would eliminate the need for
ADA plaintiffs alleging discrimination by state government to explore the
alternatives discussed in Section II above. 126

B.

I.

Other Federal Claims

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 127 prohibits
discrimination against individuals with a disability in "any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance." 128 The term "program or
activity" is defined to mean all of the operations of "a department, agency,
1~.

121
122.
123.
124.

125.
126.

as \\ell,
127.

128.

Ericl.snn, 207 F.3d al 957.
/d.
/d. a! 959
Kunel. 528 U.S. al 88-89.
/d.
~2 usc § 12202.
Whale Secuon ll addresses ADEA claims. each of the altemati'c' \\Ould apply to ADA daim,
although the arguments may differ.
29 ti.S.C. § 794.
29 U.SC. § 794(a)
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special purpo~e district, or other instrumentality of a !~tate or of a local
government," or "the entity of such !>tate or local government that
di tributes such assistance and each department or agency ... to which the
a i~tance is extended. " 129 In Section 504 cases alleging employment
di crimination, "the standards applied under Title I of the LADA]" shall
control. 1'<J Because many agencies or department · of state and local
government receive federal financial assistance, Section 504 will be a
u eful alternative to the ADA.
Plaintiffs alleging disability discrimination by state employees in
violation of Section 504 are likely to face an Eleventh Amendment defense.
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon. the Court held that the State of
California could not be sued in federal court for violating the Rehabilitation
Act. 111 Shortly after the decbion in Scanlon, Congress explicitly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits brought under Section 504, as
well as other spending statutes. 112 This Act applies "to violations that occur
in whole or in part after October 21, 1986."1'3 However, based on Kimel,
state employers sued under Section 504 may argue that Congress did not
validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Prior to the decision in Kimel. the lower courts routinely upheld the
power of Congress to eliminate the Eleventh Amendment defense in claims
brought pursuant to the federal funding statutes. 1.\ol Some courts concluded
that Congress had the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,''~ while others held that
Congress permissibly conditioned receipt of federal funds on an
unambiguous wruver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 1 \.., The Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that Congress has broad power to impose

29 u S.C.§ 794Cbl. incorporating 42 U.S.L § 2000d-4a.
29 U S.C.§ 794(d).
131. Atascadero Swte Hosp '. Scanlon, 473 u.S 234. 242 ( 1985).
m. 42 u.s c § 2000d-7.
l.l3. 42 u.s c § 2000d-7(h).
1.~
Su mfra note' 135 and 136.
m. Su. ~.g. Fuller v. Ra)bum, 161 f .3d 516. 51!! (8th Cir. 1998) (Title Vl), Lc..age \ State of
Te.,as, 158 F_ld 213. 216· 19 (5th Cir. 1998), r~' 'don otlru grounds und rtmandtd. 528 U S. I !I { 1999)
<Title VI); Frank\ v. Kenrucly Sch for the Deaf 1~2 F 3d 360, 362-63 (6th Cir 1998) (Title IX); C:ark
v. California. 123 f .3d 1267. 1269-71 (9th Cir 1997), em den it'd, 524 U.S. 937 ( 1998) (Secuon 504);
Lam v. Cumtor. of Univ. of \iissouri. Kansas City Dental Sch.. 122 F.3d 654. 655-56 (8th Cir. 1997}
(Title IX).
136. Pedcrwn \ .Louisiana State Univ., 213 f .3d 858, !176 (5th Cir 2000) (Tttle fX), Sando-..ul v.
Bogan, 197 f.3d 484. 492-500 (II • Cir. 1999) (Title VI), em. grunttd, l2l S. Ct. 28 12000); Lttman v.
George ~1ason Univ., 186 F.:ld 5~ 549-57 (4th Cir. 1999) (Title IX), Rosa H v San Elinrio lndep.
Scll Di~t.. 106 F.3d 648.654 (5th Ctr 1997) <Title lXl
Comport Atascadero State Ho~p. v. Scanlon, 473 US. 23~. 2~7 ( 1985) (holding that men: acceptance: of
federal fund' doc~ not con\titute a \\<atver; decided before Congre" passed abrogation statute containing
the "clear language" mand;ited by the Supreme Court decisiOn).
12'J.
130.

126
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conditions on its monetary allotments, t37 and that state sovereignty is not
violated since states are free to reject the funds.'\8 Provided the terms are
clear, the program promotes the general welfare, the conditions are properly
related to the purpose of the expenditure, and the program is not "coercive,"
it wil1 be upheld. 139 In fact, the Court ha~ not invalidated a conditional
spending program since the 1930's. t40 In light of Kimel and the new
federalism, reliance on spending power as the source for anti-discrimination
measures is less problematic, and several courts have now utilized this
approach in holding that states are subject to suit under Section 504 and
other federal funding statutes.t4 t
When suing under Section 504, employees should name the entity that
receives the federal financial a<>sistance as the defendant.t4 :! While
administrative complaints may be filed with the federal agency disbursing
the federal funds, 143 exhaustion of such remedies is not required before
137. See. e.g.. South Dakota v. Dole. 483 U.S. 203 ( 1987). See also Pcnnhurst State Sch. and
Hosp. v. Haldennan, 451 U.S. I, 17 ( 1981 ); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444. 461 ( 1978):
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958). Hehering v. Da\i ~. 301 U.S. 619,
640-4 1 ( 1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davi~. 301 U.S. 548. 590 ( 1937); United States v. Butler. 297 u.S
I, 65 ( 1936). This holding in Dole wa> confUllled in College Savings Bank 1. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educa/1011 t:fpense Board, 527 U.S. 666.686-87 ( 1999).
138. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. , 451 U.S. at 17.
J3Q South Dakota v. Dole, 483 L.S. at 206.
'4(). See Kathleen M. Sullivan. U11con.llilt11ional Conduiom, 102 HARV. L. RLV., 14 13, 1417
(1989).
t 41. See supra note 136.
142. See Kinman v. Omaha Puh. Sch. DisL. 17 1 1·.3d 607, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
teacher involved in a sexual relation\hip with a student could not be held liable under Title IX in her
individual capacity); f-loyd v. Wa1ter~. 133 F.3d 786, 789-90 (II th Cir. 1998) (holding that only gmnt
recipient, in this case lhe local school district, can be held liable under Title IX); Sm1th v. Metropolitan
Sch. Di ~t. Perry Tp., 128 F.3d 1014, 1018-21 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 951 ( 1998) (holding
that only grant rec1p1ent can violate Title IX and, therefore, lhe principal and as~istant pnncipal could
not be ~ued in either !heir indh idual or official capacity; as to lhe official capacity, the Court looked to
Indiana law and concluded it docs not give principals and as\1~tant principals administrative contml over
educational programs or activitle\); Grtan v. Charter Ho~p. ofN.W. lnd., 104 F.3d 116, 119-20 (7th Cir.
1997) (holdmg that employees of rec1p1ent> of federal financial ru.si\tance are not recipients of such
assistance and, therefore, are not proper defendant' in an action under Scctmn 504); Buchanan v.
Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F. 3d 1352, 1356 {61h Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VI action could not be maintained
against individuals responsible for the challenged action, hut only against the cnuty rece1vmg federal
financ1al a."1stance); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Disl. 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining
that lhc lower court held !hat school coun..elor, whose inaction m a peer se·wal harassment case, could
not be sued a> an individual under Title IX, hut t:ould be sued for Title IX \ iolations lhrough Section
1983; Court of Appeals did not reach lhe i"ue).
Compare Grune v. Rodriquez, 176 F.3d 27,33-34 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding. wilhout d1scu~~mg whether
ind1viduah o.~.ere proper defendants under Section 504, they could not he liable for lmowing inaction m
the face of discrimination perpetrated hy others, at least where the defendants were not \ Uper. I'OI'> of
the perpetmtor,); Mennonc v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. Conn. 1995) (holding that, in a T1tle IX
action by a female high school student allegmg se11ual harassment hy a male Mudent. a teacher and
superintendent, who were asked to intervene but refused. had sufficient control over the instirution that
they were proper defendant~).
1·13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (fitlc VI); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (Title IX ): 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)
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proceeding in court. 144 The forum ~tate's general personal injuf) statute of
limitation~ may control , but court~ use a 'ariety of limitations periods. 145
The full range of relief, including injunctive relief, 146 compensatory
damagcs, 147 and attorney fees t48 is available under Section 504; however,
punitive damages are generally not available. t49 The Seventh Amendment
right to trial by jury applies to actions for damages under Section 504. 1 ~0
Because of the uncertainty about the application of Kimel to the ADA,
employment discrimination claims against state government should include
n claim under Section 504, assuming the threshold requirement of federal
financial assistance is met.tst

2.

Section 1983 - Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Persons alleging disability discrimination in empiO) ment by state
government should also consider a Section 1983 claim to enforce the equal

(mal..ing available the "r~mcdie~. procedure~. and ri11hts ~-et forth in Title Vf' to pc~n' aggrieved by
the failure o f recipient, of federal financial u."i~tancc to comply wtth SecL1on 5~). The federal
ogencic~ d"tributing the federal funds also ha\e the authonl) to promulgate regulations. Su 42 U.S.C
§ :!OOOd-llTitle VI); 20 U.S.C § 1682 (Tille IX); 29 U S.C § 794(a) (Rehabilitation Act).
14-1. Cannon v, Umv. of Ch1cago, 441 t:.S. 677, 706 (1979). Su ulm Bot>t.'IISTD''FR A"'0
LEVINSON. STATF .\'1,() L<x.'AL GOVERN\ff"Nl CIVIL RIGHTS LLABILITY. § 8 36 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp.).
14~. For case, u'ing a personolmJU'} statute of hm1tations..1u, ~.g., F\erell v. Cnhh County Sch.
Ot>t., 13R F .3d 1407, 1409-1 0 (11th Cir. 1998). Southerland v. Hardyoway Mgmt.. Inc.. 41 F.3d 250.
253-55 (6th Cir. 1995); Cheeney v. Highland Cmly Coli., 15 F 3d 79, 81 (7th Cir. 1994); Bate\ v. Long
bland R. Co., 997 F 2d 1028. 1036-37 (2d Cu.. cert. d~m~d. 510 U.S 992 (1993): Ual.er ~.Board of
Regent, ol Kansas. 991 F 2d 628. 631-32 (lOth Cir. 1993); Hickey v. In ing Independence Sch. Dtst,
976 F.2d 980, 982·84 (5th Cir 1992); Mor.e v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122. 124·27 !2d Ctr 1992!; Hall
' Knnu County Bd of Fduc.. 941 F.2d 402. 407-08 (6th Cir, 1991 ); Fleming v. ew Vorl. Univ., 865
l .:!d 478.481 n. I (2d Cir 1989) (applymg mo~t appropriate \tate starutc (Lhree-ye.tr)).
CtJmparc McCullough v Branch Banl.ing & Trust Co., 35 F.3d 127, 130-32 (4th Cir. 1994). em.
d('llied, 513 U.S. 1151 ( 1995) (holdmg that Secuon 504 acllun' governed by Nnnh Carohna·~ 180-day
limitation~ period contained in ib statute prohibiting discrimmallon based on dl\uhtluy. since 11 "the
most anslogou~ state Malute and is not incon'i'tent with federal policies underlymg Sccuon 504):
Wu lsl.y v. Mcd. Coli. of Hampton R<b.. I F.3d 222.224 (4th Cir 1993), cut. d~ni~d. 510 L.S 1073
(1994 ) (holding that one-year statute of hmitations in V1rgm•a Rights of Per.on~ With D•..ah•hues Act,
rather than its rwo-}ear pe11>0nal injllr) \tatute. governs a Section 5~ action I.
146. BOOtNSTEI-;FR A'Iii> l.t.VINSON, ST\T!; AND LocAl GO\LR.'I,~IE."<I CIVIl. RIGHTS Ll ·\RO.ITY §
8:40 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp. ).

147 /d. at § 8:37
141!. See 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b). Su also id. at § 8:42
149. BODF.NSTEINLR ASD LFVI1\SO~. STATE AND LOCAL Go\'F.RN\iENT CIVIL RIGIITS LIABILITY§
8:39 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp.).
150. Su, ~.g .. Waldrop v S Co. Servs .. Inc.. 24 F.3d 152. 156 () lth Cir. 1994): Pandazidc~ v.
Virgm1a Bd. ol Educ.. 13 E3d 823.832-33 (4th Cir. 1994); Smith'· Banon. 914 F.2d I.BO. 1337 (9Lh
Cir 1990).
1 ~1
Se~ BODF'OSTLL'Iit.:R AND LFVTIIiSOI\, STATE .-\'1,() Loc.- .t. CJOVE.RJ\ML'IIT CiVIl . RtGIITS
LIABII.ITY § 8:12-8:15 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp.).
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protection claU',e of the Fourteenth Amendment. m While the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits such cases against the state or its agencies,
government ofticials, in their official capacity, are subject to suit for
prospective relief in accordance with the Ex parte Young doctrine.153
Further, officials ma:y be sued in their individual capacity for damages 1S4
subject, however, to a possible qualified immunity defense.m The primary
hurdle in such cases is that only a rational basis standard will be utilized. 156
Although in the context of age discrimination, employees have not fared
well in establishing that age bias is irrational,m Cleburne holds that certain
fears and prej udice against the disabled may not withstand even rational
basis review. 1 ~8
IV.
CONCLUSION

Employees of local governmental agencies should have no problem
enforcing ADEA rights in the same manner as employees of private
employers. In contrast, enforcement of ADEA rights has become quite
complex for state employees. However, the options discussed in Section II

1~2. City of Cleburne\ , Cleburne Livmg Clr.• 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Comp<1r~ Heller v. Doe. 509
l.J.S. 3 12 ( 1993).
l~.l See supra notes 44 and 49.
154. Alden v. Matne, 527 U.S. 706. 757 (1999); Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 2 1, 25-31 (1999).
155. The 'o-called "good faith" immunity gives government officials an affirmative defense to
individual liability where the rights a'~rted by the plamuff were not clearly e~tabli~hed at the time of
the challenged acllon. Su BODF.IIISTF.INER A."'D Lr.VINSON. SlAII! AND LocAl GoVI:.RN~1l!NT Ctvn.
RIGHTS LIARTI.ITY §§ I :40-1:41 ( 1987 and 2000 Supp. ). An nb\(llute immunity defense is abo available
to go\ernment official~. ~ued for damages in the1r mdP<tdual capacity, II they were performing
legislative, judicial or prosccutorial functions when taking the challenged actions ld at§§ 1:36-139.
The absolute immunity defense generally will not be a\ailable in cases ch.lllen~ing employment
deci,ion~. Su. ~. g .• Forrc~ter v. White, 4&4 U.S. 219 ( 1988> (holding that ab~olute judicial immunity
doc~ not extend to judge's decision to terminate employee).
1S6. Cll) of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.. 473 L S. 432 ( 1985).
157. :>u 111pra note 106. However, dc~p1te the deferential standard applied to review cl:um\ of age
!lias. ~orne lower coun, have found classification' based on age to v10late equal protection. Su Indus.
Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado v. Romem. 912 P.2d 62, 67 (Colo. 1996) (holding that
statute pnl\1dmg that permanent total disability benefit\ paid to workers' compensallon claimants
temlinatc when claimant reaches 65, wh1le allowing all other per.on~ who sustam work-related injuries
to retain worker>.' compensation benefit~. v1olates equal protecuon provisions of federal and state
constllutlons); McMahon v. Barclay, 510 F Supp. 1114, 1116 (S.D.N. Y 1981) (holding that New York
C1vil Sen 1ce Law prohibiting employment of persons over age 29 a~ police office~ wa.' invalid because
Matute bore no mtional relation~hip to an) legitimate •tate purpo~ and was v10la11ve of equal
protection).
1511.. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.. 473 U.S 432 ( 1985). Su also Martell v. Estado
Libre A~ociado de Puerto Rico. 4!! 1-. Supp. 2d 81, 89-90 (D P R. 1999) (holdmg that former teacher
who claimed di,uhility discrimination stated§ 1983 claim ba_<.ed on equal protection); Wright'· City of
Tampa. 998 L Supp. 1398. 1403 (M.D. Aa. 1998) (den)ing defendant's motion for summary JUdgment
where plaintiff. a city emplo}ec, claimed disabiliry discrimination in violation of equal protection).
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above should enable state employees to enforce all, or at least a portion of,
their rights guaranteed by the ADEA. The fate of state employees with
ADA claims remains uncertain until the next term of the Supreme Court.
However, even if the Court decides the ADA is controlled by Kimel, ADA
plaintiffs will be able to use the alternatives explored in Section II and
Section III-B.

